




3 June 1994

Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 93-3 Jun 94

A Methodology for the Transition From  
National Strategy to Adaptive Force Packaging

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This study proposes a methodology for determining adaptive force packaging in support of martial operations. This non-quantitative process traces the path from national strategy to force selection for either preemptive or reactionary military deployments. The intention is to provide the planner with a template for appropriate military force selection in support of national objectives. The I-5 Model, initially developed by the author as an aid in defining how the military integrates into national strategy, forms the basis of this thesis. This model formalizes the path from national strategy to a defined operational environment and incorporates the five elements of national power--military, economic, political/diplomatic, informational and humanitarian. Examination of the environment of military operations, traditionally termed "battle space" is also a salient aspect of this study. A proposed new concept, Milspace, expands on the definition of battle space to include both combat and non-combat operations and accounts for external influences and time. Finally, as an adjunct to this research, this study provides a tabular compilation of all military forces available to the planner.

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National Strategy, Force Packaging, Adaptive Force  
Packaging, Force Planning

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**A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree**

**MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE**

**by**

**DAVID W. GRUBER, LCDR, USN  
B. A. , Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1979**

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**THESIS APPROVAL PAGE**


**Name of Candidate:** David Wolf Gruber, Lieutenant Commander, USN

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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

**A METHODOLOGY FOR THE TRANSITION FROM NATIONAL STRATEGY TO  
ADAPTIVE FORCE PACKAGING** by Lieutenant Commander David W. Gruber,  
USN, 137 pages.

This study proposes a methodology for determining adaptive force packaging in support of martial operations. This non-quantitative process traces the path from national strategy to force selection for either preemptive or reactionary military deployments. The intention is to provide the planner with a template for appropriate military force selection in support of national objectives.

The I-5 Model, initially developed by the author as an aid in defining how the military integrates into national strategy, forms the basis of this thesis. This model formalizes the path from national strategy to a defined operational environment and incorporates the five elements of national power--military, economic, political/diplomatic, informational and humanitarian.

Examination of the environment of military operations, traditionally termed "battle space" is also a salient aspect of this study. A proposed new concept, Milspace, expands on the definition of battle space to include both combat and non-combat operations and accounts for external influences and time.

Finally, as an adjunct to this research, this study provides a tabular compilation of all military forces available to the planner.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to personally acknowledge the contributions of my thesis committee. Their guidance, criticisms, and recommendations immeasurably contributed to the completion of this study. I would be remiss if I did not single out my committee Chairman, LTC Louis Sperl. His insight, personal demeanor, encouragement and knowledge were of the highest caliber. I feel truly lucky to have had such a professional as my thesis Chair.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>A</b>	<b>Army</b>
<b>AAV</b>	<b>Assault Amphibious Vehicle</b>
<b>AAW</b>	<b>Anti-Air Warfare</b>
<b>AF</b>	<b>Air Force</b>
<b>AFSC</b>	<b>Armed Forces Staff College</b>
<b>AI</b>	<b>Air Intercept</b>
<b>ASUW</b>	<b>Anti-Surface Warfare</b>
<b>ASW</b>	<b>Anti-Submarine Warfare</b>
<b>ATACMS</b>	<b>Advanced Tactical Missile System</b>
<b>BAI</b>	<b>Basic Air Interdiction</b>
<b>BFV</b>	<b>Bradley Fighting Vehicle</b>
<b>C2</b>	<b>Command and Control</b>
<b>CAS</b>	<b>Close Air Support</b>
<b>CFV</b>	<b>Calvary Fighting Vehicle</b>
<b>CG</b>	<b>Guided Missile Cruiser</b>
<b>CGN</b>	<b>Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear)</b>
<b>CINC</b>	<b>Commander-in-Chief</b>
<b>CINCFOR</b>	<b>Commander-in-Chief Forces Command</b>
<b>CJCS</b>	<b>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</b>
<b>COMLINT</b>	<b>Communications Intelligence</b>
<b>CONUS</b>	<b>Continental United States</b>
<b>CSAR</b>	<b>Combat Search and Rescue</b>

<b>CSCE</b>	<b>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</b>
<b>CSH</b>	<b>Corps Surgical Hospital</b>
<b>CV</b>	<b>Aircraft Carrier</b>
<b>CVBG</b>	<b>Aircraft Carrier Battle Group</b>
<b>D/N</b>	<b>Day/Night</b>
<b>DD</b>	<b>Destroyer</b>
<b>DDG</b>	<b>Guided Missile Destroyer</b>
<b>DoD</b>	<b>Department of Defense</b>
<b>EC</b>	<b>European Community</b>
<b>ECCM</b>	<b>Electronic Counter-Counter Measure</b>
<b>ECM</b>	<b>Electronic Counter Measures</b>
<b>ELINT</b>	<b>Electronic Intelligence</b>
<b>EPW</b>	<b>Enemy Prisoners of War</b>
<b>ESM</b>	<b>Electronic Signals Measures</b>
<b>EW</b>	<b>Electronic Warfare</b>
<b>FAS</b>	<b>Forward Air Support</b>
<b>FEMA</b>	<b>Federal Emergency Management Agency</b>
<b>FF</b>	<b>Frigate</b>
<b>FFG</b>	<b>Guided Missile Frigate</b>
<b>FLIR</b>	<b>Forward Looking Infra-Red Radar</b>
<b>HMMWV</b>	<b>High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheel Vehicle</b>
<b>HUMINT</b>	<b>Human Intelligence</b>
<b>ITV</b>	<b>Improved TOW Vehicle</b>
<b>JCS</b>	<b>Joint Chiefs of Staff</b>
<b>JOPES</b>	<b>Joint Operational Planning and Execution System</b>
<b>JPEC</b>	<b>Joint Planning and Execution Committee</b>
<b>JSCP</b>	<b>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</b>

<b>JTF</b>	<b>Joint Task Force</b>
<b>JULLS</b>	<b>Joint Lessons Learned System</b>
<b>LAU</b>	<b>League of Arab States</b>
<b>LAV</b>	<b>Light Armored Vehicle</b>
<b>LCY</b>	<b>League of Communists of Yugoslavia</b>
<b>LHD</b>	<b>Landing Helicopter Dock</b>
<b>LPA</b>	<b>Landing Platform Assault</b>
<b>LPH</b>	<b>Landing Platform Helicopter</b>
<b>LST</b>	<b>Landing Ship Tank</b>
<b>M</b>	<b>Marines</b>
<b>MASH</b>	<b>Mobile Army Surgical Hospital</b>
<b>MASINT</b>	<b>Measure and Signal Intelligence</b>
<b>MCM</b>	<b>Mine Counter Measures</b>
<b>MI</b>	<b>Military Intelligence</b>
<b>MLRS</b>	<b>Multiple Launch Rocket System</b>
<b>MSO</b>	<b>Minesweeper, Ocean</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>Navy</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</b>
<b>NCA</b>	<b>National Command Authority</b>
<b>NEO</b>	<b>Non-combatant Evacuation Operations</b>
<b>NMS</b>	<b>National Military Strategy</b>
<b>NSC</b>	<b>National Security Council</b>
<b>NSS</b>	<b>National Security Strategy</b>
<b>OAU</b>	<b>Organization of African Unity</b>
<b>OPLAN</b>	<b>Operations Plan</b>
<b>PAX</b>	<b>Passengers</b>
<b>PBC</b>	<b>Patrol Boat Coastal</b>

<b>PBR</b>	<b>Patrol Boat River</b>
<b>PDF</b>	<b>Panamanian Defense Force</b>
<b>PHM</b>	<b>Hydrofoil Patrol Craft</b>
<b>Recon</b>	<b>Reconnaissance</b>
<b>RPV</b>	<b>Remote Piloted Vehicle</b>
<b>SAR</b>	<b>Search and Rescue</b>
<b>SF</b>	<b>Special Forces</b>
<b>SIGINT</b>	<b>Signal Intelligence</b>
<b>SSBN</b>	<b>Ballistic Missile Submarine (Nuclear)</b>
<b>SSN</b>	<b>Attack Submarine (Nuclear)</b>
<b>TOW</b>	<b>Tube-Launched Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided Missile</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>USSOCOM</b>	<b>United States Special Operations Command</b>
<b>Wx</b>	<b>Weather</b>
<b>YPA</b>	<b>Yugoslav People's Army</b>



## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **The Thesis Proposal**

This study proposes a methodology for determining adaptive force packaging in support of martial operations. This non-quantitative process traces the path from national strategy to force selection for either preemptive or reactionary military deployments. The intention is to provide the planner with a template for appropriate military force selection in support of national objectives.

#### **Secondary Issues**

1. **Discussion of how military operations integrate into national strategy.** The environment of military operations is not an isolated system. Instead, the development of national strategy requires an appropriate blend of all instruments of power—economic, diplomatic, informational, military and humanitarian. This research proposes the I-5 Model which formalizes the path from national strategy to a defined operational environment and incorporates all the instruments of national power.

2. **Definition of the military operating environment.** Examination of the environment of military operations, traditionally termed "battle space" is also salient to this study. This thesis proposes a new concept, Milspace. This concept describes an architecture formilitary operations that incorporates the full environment of combat and non-combat actions and the impact of external interactions and time.

### Background

The swiftness with which the post cold war era arrived has caught most of the world unprepared. Few predicted the Soviet Union's implosion and the United States' emergence as the single global super-power. The transition from cold war era to new world order will shape the conduct of world diplomacy, economy, policy, and military activities, and the U.S. must examine her role in this transition.

The military aspect of this examination is particularly fascinating. The paradox of sustaining a force reduced in size, with a force continually assigned greater and varied responsibilities, presents difficult management hurdles. Throwing in the uncertainty of eventual force end state, the ability to plan for the future is increasingly complex and challenging.

Although uncertainties exist, the values of the United States will remain constant. Because of these values the United States will continue to accept the responsibilities of a world leader. As stated by former President George Bush:

Our achievements are testament to the values that define us as a Nation—freedom, compassion, justice, opportunity, the rule of law, and hope. The impoverished, the oppressed, and the weak have always looked to the United States to be strong, to be capable, and to care. Perhaps more than anything else, they have depended on us to lead.<sup>1</sup>

In this new world order military planners recognize certain conditions. The first is a shift from a global dichotomy based on democratic and communist alignments to alignments related to regional and economic issues. Second, the weaponry of the former Soviet Union will not disappear. In fact, it is being distributed through sales and illegal means to a multitude of nations and organizations. This opening of Pandora's box may greatly enhance regional instabilities. Third, nuclear proliferation, formerly viewed as an issue of superpowers, has dangerously spread to third world countries, emerging nations, and may become available to terrorist organizations. Unchecked nuclear capability and weapons of mass destruction greatly threaten global and regional security. Finally,

there is an increased emphasis on the non-military mission capabilities of the armed forces suggesting increased military involvement in these operations.

These conditions present United States armed forces with a series of challenges both internally and externally. Reduction in forward bases, those located outside the continental United States, and decreases in numbers of forward deployed troops previously available for immediate response, compound these challenges. The challenges are manifested in the changing nature of military operations. These include a decrease in response time of United States forces to crisis, and a requirement to meticulously manage the distant deployment of troops when dealing with movement and transportation constraints.

The responsibility to accomplish these missions must also take into account the constraints associated with force restructuring and changing national strategy. These critical issues make necessary the prudent selection of appropriate forces for crisis response.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution (JOPES) system now provides procedures for force selection. Two processes compose this system. The first, the planning of operations in response to potential threats under peacetime conditions, uses the Deliberate Planning system. This process, used when lead time (usually 18-24 months) is available, includes the full Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) commanders and staffs. The second process, Crisis Action Planning provides contingency planning in response to situations requiring immediate response.<sup>2</sup>

The Deliberate Planning system is a five phase process initiated when the Unified or Specified Commander in Chief (CINC) receives planning tasks from the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The steps include: Initiation, Concept Development, Plan Development, Plan Review and Supporting Plans.<sup>3</sup> During the third stage, the Plan Development Stage, the selection of actual forces for an operation occurs. Staff planners of the component

commands select from apportioned forces, those forces assigned to the CINC in the JSCP. CJSC, individual service, and USSOCOM (for special operations) provide the guidance and doctrine for force planning.<sup>4</sup> The process involves determination of force requirements, force list development and refinement in view of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution.<sup>5</sup> The completed list includes combatant forces, combat support forces, combat service support forces, and sustainment and reinforcement forces based on apportioned strategic lift. In the JOPES process, forces are apportioned in large units (e.g., Carrier Battle Group, Air Force Wing, etc.); however, the final plan will identify specific task organized units.

The building of the force list may occur unit by unit, or by force modules; groupings of combat, combat service, combat service support forces, and 30 days of logistic supplies.<sup>6</sup> These force modules may be either a service force module, an OPLAN dependent force module, or a force tracking module.

Parent services develop service force modules designed as basic building blocks for quickly creating force lists during crisis. The CINC develops an OPLAN-dependent force module in response to a particular Operations Plan. A Force tracking module is similar to the OPLAN-dependent module but does not contain sustainment data.<sup>7</sup>

The JPEC uses Crisis Action Planning procedures to plan for and execute deployment and employment of U.S. military forces in time sensitive situations.<sup>8</sup> This is a six phase process initiated by events that might have national security implications. The phases include: Situation Development, Crisis Assessment, Course of Action Development, Course of Action Selection, Execution Planning, and Execution. Selection of forces occurs during the Course of Action Development phase. These forces are products of either JOPES force modules or OPLAN force modules prepared during the peacetime Deliberate Planning process to reduce planning time.<sup>9</sup> During crisis situations, allocation of forces by the NCA to the CINC occurs. This differs from the apportionment of forces associated with the Deliberate Planning process.

The JOPES process is an excellent tool for force planning, however, there is room for improvement. This is possible through the absorption of doctrine presented by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.<sup>10</sup> The "Weinberger Doctrine" provides definitive guidelines for the planning process and asserts:

1. U.S. Forces should only be committed to combat in defense of interests vital to our nation or allies.
2. U.S. Forces should only be committed when we have clearly defined political and military objectives.
3. The relationship between objectives and forces committed should be continually reassessed and readjusted if necessary.
4. U.S. Forces should only be committed when there is reasonable assurance of support from the American people and Congress.
5. U.S. Forces should only be committed as a last resort.
6. U.S. Forces should only be committed in numbers adequate to complete the mission.

The methodology of this thesis reflects these six points and proposes a guide to aid the military planner in selection of appropriate forces. This is accomplished through:

1. Providing a methodology which formalizes the path from national strategy to force selection,
2. Better defining the military's role in national strategy enactment,
3. Improving the definition of the military operating environment, and,
4. Providing a method for selecting the appropriate forces for specific conditions.

### Assumptions

Assumption: The United States will continue to reduce military forces.

Implication: Reduced forces will constrain planning and require more prudent management of forces.

Assumption: Weaponry will experience evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary development. Global weaponry will experience modernization, however, "Star Wars" technology is significantly futuristic. This does not assume the stability of world weapon distribution or the possibility of current technology exploitation.

Implication: Force planners can expect the same lethality and techniques from opponents as in past years. Force ratios, used in planning required unit capabilities and numbers, will not radically shift in the future.

Assumption: The ability to deploy troops and support military action will remain relatively constant. Developing equipment and equipment upgrade will not significantly change the method and time required to deliver and sustain combat forces.

Implication: Near term logistic capabilities and constraints will be similar to that of today. The time/distance relationships used for planning can be carried forward.

Assumption: Future military actions will include combat operations and operations other than war. This new operational environment will require rules of engagement that define military responsibilities under non-traditional circumstances.

Implication: There has been a shift from the traditional NATO/Soviet concept of total war to a myriad of other operations. This change is significant enough to require a total review of the military operating environment.

Assumption: Military operations will occur within and outside of the continental United States (CONUS). The inclusion of domestic responsibilities in the military mission has added a different dimension to operational requirements.

Implication: The addition of domestic missions requires an examination of the military's role and the tools and training needed to fulfill future operations.

**Assumption:** United States forces may not always rely on host nation or coalition support.

**Implication:** The military must be able to enter an operation with total self-sustainment capability.

### **Limitations**

1. The formalized analysis of force tailoring is relatively new and unique. This presents a difficulty in the search for directly related literature. Enough information dealing with peripheral issues is available to supply the raw materials necessary for study completion.

2. Case studies involving the application of the proposed methodology will address only entry operations instead of complete campaigns. Given the length constraints of this thesis, this allows a snapshot examination of the proposed methodology.

### **Delimitations**

1. This study will use a qualitative approach and explore new ideology. This allows for unrestricted concept development and circumvents the difficulties of forcing new concepts into unaccommodating existing frameworks.

2. This study will not examine the complexities of multi-national scenarios.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Former President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, 1993, p. i.

<sup>2</sup>National Defense University. AFSC PUB 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, p. 6-4.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6-18.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6-39.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6-39.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6-45.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6-45.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 7-2.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 7-19.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. News and World Report, 10 December 1984, p. 8.



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **Introduction**

Chapter 2 provides a review of literature used in completing this study. This thesis methodology is original and literature directly supporting the ideas expressed herein is not readily available. However, sufficient material existed to provide a foundation for the proposed concepts.

Research for this thesis examined: (1) the transition from national strategy to force selection, (2) an examination of the military operating environment, and, (3) a compilation of military assets available to the force planner. The arrangement of this chapter will be according to these three topics. A final section will discuss the background materials used in documentation of the case studies found in Chapter 5. The categories of documentation are as follows:

1. Government Publications
2. Armed Service Publications
3. United Nations Reference Documents
4. Reference Texts
5. Military Lessons Learned
6. Military Working Papers
7. Periodicals

### Methodology for the Transition From National Strategy to Military Force Selection

Thesis methodology stipulates that the proper way to select appropriate military forces is to ensure that these forces support national objectives. The key document defining these objectives is the National Security Strategy of the United States. First published in 1987, this White House document, publicly states how the administration views both global and domestic environments, what challenges face the United States, the guidelines for meeting these challenges, and a vision of the conduct of this country in the future. A specific format for this document does not exist, consequently the tone and the content may vary with administration. The contents of the National Security Strategy provide a basis for selection of objectives.

After identification of an objective, there should next be an examination of all instruments of national power available to exert influence on that objective. AFSC Pub 2: Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces presents four such instruments--economic, military, political and informational. The proper application of these instruments at the appropriate time is critical in achieving an objective. This thesis accepts the four instruments of national power cited in AFSC Pub 2, and considers a fifth category, the humanitarian instrument. The pentad is incorporated into the I-5 Model, (so designated to indicate the five elements of national power acting on an Area of Influence--an area created by an objective and further defined by the instruments of national power), a model describing the operational environment of which the military is a component.

The formal definition of a military operating environment eases the identification of mission requirements, the next step in force selection. Current methodology for force selection follows JOPES procedures. Chapter 1 describes this process using AFSC Pub 1: The Joint Officer's Guide as a reference for the discussion. Designed for the individual operating in a multi-service environment, AFSC Pub 1, "offers a perspective on joint planning and execution . . . presents the 'big picture' of the players, the process, and the

procedures, synthesizing elements from a wide range of sources, presenting them in a systematic manner."<sup>1</sup>

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, a classified document consulted to prevent duplication of concepts though not used as an information or idea source, contains designated forces available for particular geographical areas and operations. The JOPES process depends on allocated or apportioned forces as previously discussed and is limited to large scale unit packages. One objective of this study is the development of procedures overcoming JOPES constraints.

### The Military Operating Environment

Although all the elements of national power assist in defining an Area of Influence, this thesis focuses only on the military operating environment. Different branches of the armed services present different conceptualizations of this environment. FM 100-5 Operations describes the Army's view. The Navy and Marine Corps subscribe to the description in From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century. Air Force Manual 1-1 Volume I & II: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force presents this service's ideas. Finally, C4I for the Warrior is a joint service publication that also contains yet another description of the military operating environment.

Traditionally, the term "Battlespace" addresses the military operating area. Looking at this term today, service definitions share little common ground. The Navy takes a bare bone approach and defines Battlespace as "the sea, air and land environments where we will conduct our operations."<sup>2</sup> Air Force doctrine relies on the term "Aerospace" defined as "of, or pertaining to, the earth's envelope of atmosphere and the space above it; two separate entities considered as a single realm for activity in launching, guidance, and control of vehicles that will travel in both entities."<sup>3</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff in C4I for the Warrior, have published that, "The warriors battlespace is any area

over which the warrior exercises control or has a military interest. Commanders require an integrated picture of the ground, air, space and special operations being conducted in the Battlespace."

The Army considers Battle space (sic) to be "a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy. It includes the breadth, depth and height in which the commander positions and moves assets over time."<sup>4</sup>

Significantly, the Army does articulate that besides the physical battlefield, "Battle space also includes the operational dimensions of combat, including time, tempo, depth, and synchronization."<sup>5</sup> The Army also uses the term "Battlefield Framework" to conceptualize areas of operations, and establishes an "area of geographical and operational responsibility for the commander and provides a way to visualize how he will employ his forces against the enemy."<sup>6</sup> Finally, the Army uses the term "Area of Operations" to define "a geographical area assigned to an Army commander by a higher commander--an AO has lateral and rear boundaries which usually define it within a larger joint geographical area."<sup>7</sup> Further confusing the issue, Army literature divides battle space into two words, yet the term is one word in Navy and Joint Chiefs of Staff publications.

All of these definitions are limiting. They rely primarily on descriptions defined by physical boundaries and do not adequately consider the intangibles. These intangibles include the external influences of national power--diplomacy/politics, economics, and information; military intangibles such as leadership; and the effect of time. All of these elements shape military operations.

The definitions currently used also rely on terminology exclusively related to combat. Today, however, employment of the armed forces occurs in both hostile and non-hostile environments. Consequently, terms such as "levels of war," "engagements," and "battles," which apply to most military activities, no longer apply to all military actions. A significant amount of military activity is now non-combat in nature. In fact, operations involving use of force are now but one subset of the total military mission.

Even the physical descriptions of these current definitions do not provide a complete blueprint of the field of operations. Missing is recognition of a non-traditional battlefield, a battlefield which no longer places the enemy to the front, friendly forces to the rear, and a defined line of engagement.

Most importantly, time affects all the above to make the field of operations a constantly changing area. This is a highly significant concept that is not adequately incorporated into the above descriptions. Finally, there is not a definition currently in use common to all the services. All of these limitations degrade understanding of the military operating area, an understanding necessary for optimum military operations. This absence of a common conceptualization lead to development of Milspace, a concept developed during this study, that attempts to define the environment in which the military operates.

#### Compilation of Military Assets Available to the Planner

AFSC Pub 2: Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan both contain tables of United States military forces. These compilations are neither extensive or detailed, and mostly list upper echelon forces--those forces at the highest organizational level. The components of these large organizations should be identified separately in order to most efficiently match forces to mission requirements. This degree of separation is unavailable in a single source. In congruence with the I-5 Model and to aid in case study examination, Appendix A provides a tabular compilation of military combat, non-combat, and combat support assets by land, sea, air, and space categories. The following publications were major sources consulted in completing these tables.

1. Army FM 101-1-1/1 Staff Officer's Field Manual
2. The United States Navy Policy Book 1992
3. United States Marine Corps Concepts and Issues 93
4. AIR FORCE Magazine May 1993/Almanac Issue

5. Desert Score

6. Jane's All the World's Aircraft

7. Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships

These sources varied in echelon of discussion. Army FM 101-1-1/1 is perhaps the most detailed. It lists equipment, manning requirements, and missions down to the company level. The United States Navy Policy Book and the United States Marine Corps Concepts and Issues pamphlets provide major organizational structures. Jane's Publications identifies lower echelon forces and a very detailed list of equipment is found in the text Desert Score. Jane's reference and Desert Score also provided added detail to the information of Air Force Magazine.

Case Studies

The examination of three past actions--Operation Just Cause: the United States Invasion of Panama, Operation Restore Hope: United States Action in Somalia, and, Hurricane Andrew Relief Efforts in Florida in 1992, provided an opportunity for non-quantitative application of thesis methodology to actual operations. An additional study examined force selection for theoretical action in the former Yugoslavia.

The three historical actions used background material for (1) identification of national goals and objectives, (2) identification of military objectives, (3) identification of military forces involved in the operation, and, (4) analysis of the outcome. Only a historical perspective was extracted from the literature during study of the Balkan conflict.

Extensive documentation existed for all operations. The text, Battle for Panama was invaluable in providing information on Operation Just Cause. This newly published narrative of the operation from planning to execution is well detailed and meticulously researched.

Information on Operation Restore Hope was extracted from Somalia: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope, a U.S. Army War College

Publication, a United Nations Reference Paper, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could Do Something About, a Washington Post newspaper article, and numerous State Department Dispatches. The combination of official documents, articles, and dispatches provided an extensive view of the operation.

The Army Center for Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, provided the sources detailing the operation, orders, and events of the Hurricane Andrew Relief Effort. These were predominantly military lessons learned and lecture notes.

The Yugoslav Conflict: A Chronology of Events, published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, was instrumental in supplying the background material for the final case study.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>National Defense University, AFSC PUB 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, Introductory Letter.

<sup>2</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Navy and Marine Corps, ...FROM THE SEA, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, Washington, D.C., p. 9.

<sup>3</sup>Headquarters, United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 Volume 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, March 1992, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations, Washington, D.C. 1993, p. 6-12.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 6-13.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 6-12.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., Glossary-0.



## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

This chapter describes the development of a methodology used to select appropriate military forces for a given situation. This methodology provides a clear path from national strategy to force selection and incorporates national security strategy, national military strategy, and procedures for selection of military objectives. Additionally, there is correlation between these objectives and the military operating environment.

Three phases comprised the research methodology. Phase I determined force requirements. This provided the basis for selection of tailored forces for military operations. Phase II tested this technique using historical examples and gave opportunity for model modification and retesting. Phase III applied the refined model to a non-resolved conflict to examine future feasibility and applicability. Phases II and III examined only entry forces, those forces initially needed for the start of an operation. Entry actions are a microcosm of an entire operation and the conclusions reached using this method are applicable to all stages of an operation.

#### Phase I

Three steps comprised Phase I. The first step developed a model for determining force requirements. The second step provided the forces needed for those requirements, and, the third step matched available forces to mission requirements.

## Methodology Development

The initial, and most difficult obstacle encountered during methodology development, was how to define the military operating environment. The "I-5 Model," developed during the course of this thesis, removed this obstacle. Simply stated, the I-5 Model is a paradigm translating strategic objectives into a defined operational environment. The "I" signifies an Area of Influence and the "5" reflects the five instruments of national power--economic, military, informational, diplomatic/political, and humanitarian, affecting this Area of Influence.<sup>1</sup> This thesis focuses on the military instrument of power and uses the I-5 Model to illustrate the relationship of strategic policy to military operations. The I-5 Model is fully discussed in Chapter 4.

Within the I-5 Model is a definition of the military operating environment termed "Milspace." In addition to accounting for the intangibles affecting military operations, Milspace incorporates the Army's deep/close/rear concept of the battlefield as described in Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5) Operations.<sup>2</sup> Traditionally applied in a linear fashion, the Army's model superimposes the close area over troops in direct contact, the deep battle area on the enemy's side of the close area, and the rear battle area on the friendly side of the close area. Specifically, FM 100-5 defines close operations as "offensive or defensive operations where forces are in immediate contact with the enemy."<sup>3</sup> Deep operations are those "designed in depth to secure advantages in later engagements, protect the current close fight, and defeat the enemy more rapidly by denying freedom of action disrupting or destroying the coherence and tempo of operations."<sup>4</sup> Rear operations "assist in providing freedom of action and continuity of operations, logistics and battle command. Their primary purposes are to sustain the current close and deep fights and to posture the force for further operations."<sup>5</sup>

This approach suited the well-modeled NATO/Soviet scenarios but seemed inadequate for present and future operations. Instead, this study proposes the "node" concept--a close area centered on an objective, surrounded concentrically by the deep

area. Entry operations assume detachment of the rear from the close, possibly existing either at-sea with a supporting battle group, landbased at the initial point of departure or an intermediate staging base. The single or multiple nodes established for an entry operation might transition to the traditional linear deep/close/rear at the end of the entry stage.

### Node Placement

The placement of the close and deep battle areas aided in determining entry force requirements. For example, if these areas were in-land, land forces would constitute the majority of entry forces. A littoral node that included land and sea components might require amphibious units and other naval forces in support. The non-topographical characteristics of the node would also aid in defining the method of entry and the combat support requirements. Figures 1 and 2 show the node concept and node application respectively.

Node placement is a function of strategic, operational or tactical objectives, applied to an opponent's center of gravity. As defined by Clausewitz, a center of gravity is "that characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. It exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war."<sup>6</sup> Using centers of gravity to determine mission objectives, one can decide on node placement(s). Although objectives define the placement of essential mission nodes, external conditions influence node composition.

### Node Boundaries

Defining node boundaries required an acceptance of the environment as three-dimensional and an appreciation of effects other than physical. The spatial definition of the node increased in complexity, especially when including the influences of space based systems. Now, not only did the two-dimensional node have sub-areas, but the




Figure 1. Different Node Types




Figure 2. Node Placements

three-dimensional environment exhibited separate atmospheric and space characteristics. This concept is in concert with the United States Air Force's contention that the aerospace environment is an indivisible whole when considered for exploitation, but physically different in terms of space and atmosphere.<sup>7</sup>

Although usually conceived as a physical area, non-quantitative aspects, such as logistics, intelligence, and electronic elements, influence the operating environment. Additionally, while possible to define a node at a particular moment, the influences affecting node boundaries change with time, hence the boundaries themselves are dynamic. Incorporating these considerations, the node bounds are: a geographically constrained base, an infinite ceiling, and, artificially determined lateral boundaries all of which vary with time. Figure 3 depicts a modified node.




Figure 3. Modified Node

The characteristics of a modified node, created by inclusion of these external conditions, determine the specific elements and the direct and supporting force requirements of an operation. These requirements are also under the constraints of time and logistics, modifiers that complete the process for determining appropriate forces.

## **Available Forces**

Construction of United States Order of Battle Tables in congruence with the I-5 Model enabled the comparison of mission requirements to available forces. The only document able to supply this information in the desired format was AFSC PUB 2: Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, the force capability matrices of this manual were not of sufficient detail. Grouping forces according to capability supported I-5 Model architecture. Appendix A presents these forces in tabular form. Because optimum deployment of forces may require small tailored units, and logistic and transportation constraints may also negate the deployment of complete commands, the force tables show the component commands of large organizations. Appendix B compliments Appendix A by providing typical United States force organization and descriptions. The final step of Phase I was the comparison of force requirements to force availability using these tables.

## **Force Tailoring**

Phase I matched available forces, as listed in Appendix A, to the mission requirements as determined by the I-5 Model Milspace element. Tables 1 through 3 are generic examples of the tables used to aid in this match. The case studies in Chapter 5 contain specific tables associated with particular operations.

## **Phase II**

Phase II used the methodology of Phase I to analyze three past military operations. The selected case studies reflect a cross section of martial operations to include successful and unsuccessful engagements. Although the studies address only United States actions, the methodology is applicable to non-US operations. Non-qualitative analysis tested the methodology to emphasize applicability instead of statistical validation.

**TABLE 1**  
**FORCE REQUIREMENTS (COMBAT)**

Mission	Environment	Opposition Forces	Own Forces
Objective			Presence/Parity/ Superiority/ Supremecy

**TABLE 2**  
**FORCE REQUIREMENTS (NON-COMBAT)**

Mission	Environment	Situation/Obstacles	Own Forces
Objective			

**TABLE 3**  
**FORCE REQUIREMENTS (SUPPORT)**

Mission	Force Support Elements	Own Forces
Objective		

The first case study was Operation Just Cause. This 1989 invasion of Panama by the United States exemplified a successful combat operation. The second case study examined United States Operations in Somalia: Operation Restore Hope. Somalia, an action that did not fit neatly into either combat or non-combat category. This provided an opportunity to identify difficulties in an operation and suggest alternatives using thesis methodology. The third case study reviewed 1992 relief efforts in southern Florida after Hurricane Andrew. This last historical study exemplified a domestic non-combat operation, one of the newer missions assigned to the United States active duty military.

### Phase III

To test the ability of force development using a political situation as a basis, Phase III applied the proposed methodology to the hypothetical involvement of United States military forces in the former Yugoslavia. This was an unconstrained exercise allowing freedom in the definition of national strategy, military strategy and military objectives. Unclassified articles constituted the background of this exercise, and therefore, the proposals and concepts do not reflect official planning.



### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Usually only four instruments of national power--economic, diplomatic/political, military, and informational receive recognition. The humanitarian instrument has been added by the author.

<sup>2</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations, Washington, D.C. 1993, p. 6-13.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Glossary-1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., Glossary-2.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., Glossary-7.

<sup>6</sup>AFSC PUB 1, p. I-4 Although the definition refers to a military center of gravity, the author believes that the center of gravity is not necessarily military related and that economic, humanitarian, political and informational centers of gravity may also exist. The military or some other instrument of power may be used to effect these centers of gravity. This concept is important to the I-5 Model.

<sup>7</sup>Headquarters, United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 Volume 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., March, 1992, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup>National Defense University, AFSC PUB 2: Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, p. II-4-7.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE I-5 MODEL**

#### **Introduction**

Developed to support this thesis, the I-5 Model formalizes the path from national policy to a defined operational environment. This model incorporates national strategy, national security strategy and the established concept of instruments of national power. Taken together, these elements establish an Area of Influence, which provides a focus for policy application.

Traditionally, four instruments of national power: military, economic, diplomatic, and informational, comprise the resources employed by a nation to exert her will. The military instrument is the collection of a nation's weapons and equipment, trained manpower, organizations, doctrines, industrial base, and sustainment equipment.<sup>1</sup> The economic element is a nation's means of protecting its own industry and markets, stabilizing the economy and government of friends and allies, destabilizing the economy of enemies, and preventing destabilization and hostile actions by other nation-states.<sup>2</sup> Actions accomplished through communication and relationships in the global environment, which allow a nation to exert its influence, constitute the diplomatic/political instruments of national power. These include negotiations, treaties, recognition and alliances.<sup>3</sup> Finally, processes that provide for collection and dissemination of information comprise the informational instrument of power. The I-5 Model includes a fifth instrument of national power, the humanitarian instrument. The resources in this category include those efforts that relieve human suffering and support human rights. Examples are the supply of manpower or resources in response to natural disasters, the transport of materials to a

stricken area, or the support of groups supporting humanitarian ideals. The reasons behind the employment of this instrument vary with a nation's ideologies; however, the consequences of these actions serve to increase or decrease a nation state's prestige and status.

### Model Framework

The I-5 Model begins with the establishment of national strategy, an expression of national policy. National security strategy, a subset of national strategy, expresses the issues necessary to ensure a nation's security. These issues form the foundation of the objectives used to define an Area of Influence.

Establishment of objectives occurs at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The strategic objectives included in this framework differ from the national strategic objectives discussed in the National Security Strategy of the United States.<sup>4</sup> They are instead the objectives, established according to the I-5 Model, that support national strategy. Examples include the re-establishment of Kuwaiti sovereignty after the 1990 invasion by Iraq, humanitarian relief in Somalia during 1993 famine conditions, and re-establishment of Panamanian democracy in response to the dictatorship of Manuel Noriega. These strategic objectives provide the foundation for operational objectives--the major operations designed to achieve the strategic mission. Gaining or regaining control of a physical area, establishing presence, establishing or re-establishing infrastructure, and area restabilization, are examples of these objectives. Tactical objectives constitute the smallest organized actions required to support strategic or operational objectives. Included are the traditional concepts of battles and engagements, and, non-combat actions such as maintaining civil order, defeat of an enemy's forces, establishment of freedom of movement, and re-establishment of food and water distribution.

The Area of Influence is an environmental sphere a nation must control to achieve an objective. Objectives create and shape each Area of Influence, and the

instruments of national power provide for further definition. Although the individual effects of these influences vary with time and the degree of impact, the overall effect on the Area of Influence is an amalgamation of all of these ingredients. Figure 4 shows the basic framework of the I-5 Model.

### Milspace

The military component of an Area of Influence is Milspace.<sup>3</sup> Milspace is the full environment of military combat and/or non-combat influences associated with an operational area as affected by time. Milspace does not exist in isolation but instead acts together with the other instruments of power.

When the military addresses the Area of Influence, there occurs a full complement of strategical, operational, and tactical objectives. Figure 5 illustrates this situation. Each of these hierarchical military objectives establishes its own operational environment and force requirements. If at any time achievement of an objective occurs at any level, there is no requirement to continue to the subordinate level. Conversely, failure to achieve an objective may require reexamination of a higher level strategy. Eliminate the force requirements, and this framework is a model for action by the other four instruments of the I-5 Model as well.

There is a wide array of considerations to examine when determining how the military will operate in Milspace. These considerations fall under two broad categories--Force Employment (the examination of asset selection and how to apply these assets) and Force Support (the analysis of how support services will aid Force Employment). Figure 6 shows these categories.

Combat and non-combat activities comprise the Force Employment component. Combat operations describe military employment under hostile or potentially hostile conditions. Non-combat operations detail the use of military assets as manpower and material resources rather than as instruments of force. There may, however, be




Figure 4. The I-5 Model




Figure 5. Three-way Path From Objective to Force Requirements




Figure 6. Milspace Categories

non-combat operations that require security support. The Military element of Force Support takes this into account. The next series of charts, Figures 7 through 9, identify the myriad of considerations addressed by the Force Employment and Force Support components. Some of the Force Employment considerations differ depending on whether an operation is a combat or non-combat one. For Force Support, there are ten broad categories--the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), intelligence, logistics, military, economics, politics, information, leadership, space, and, command and control. These ten "Common Denominators of Military Operations" remain constant whether an operation is combat or non-combat. The components of these ten common denominators may, however, differ.

### The Influence of Time

Incorporation of the element of time completes the I-5 Model. During an operation, the implementation or significance of individual instruments of power may change. Variations in the Area of Influence correspond to these changes. The impact may be inconsequential or may be significant enough to warrant a revision of an objective. Figure 10 illustrates this relationship. This formula depicts the Area of Influence as a function of time and dependent on the five influence factors.

Figure 11, which is a hypothetical representation, examines various time intervals during an operation. At Time D, the beginning of the operation, all five instruments of power are present. In this example, the economic power is most influential. As the operation continues, the levels of the different instruments increase until D1. Here the diplomatic element reaches a plateau, possibly symbolizing a stalemate in negotiations. In response the military instrument increases as an alternative to achieving the set objective. At some point, the cumulative effect on the Area of Influence must exceed the required effect needed to achieve an objective to realize success. D2 depicts this event. Although the military instrument is strongest at D2, the combined application of all five






Figure 7. Milspace: Force Employment (Combat)






Figure 9. Milspace: Force Support

$$\int_D^{D2} f(x)d(t)$$

where:


x = Area of Influence

D = Beginning of operation

D2= End of operation

t = Time

Figure 10. Area of Influence as a Function of Time



D = Beginning of Operation  
D1 = Diplomatic Stalemate  
D2 = Objective Achieved  
D3 = End of Operation

Figure 11. Effect of Instruments of Power on an Area of Influence vs. Time

instruments of power determines the overall effect on the Area of Influence.

Consequently, the ability to achieve an objective is dependent on the application of instruments of power over time. However, the most effective solution to a situation is the empowerment of the appropriate instruments at the optimum time. Figure 12 presents an overview of an actual operation, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm. Figure 13 is the I-5 Model representation of this operation.

#### Application of the I-5 Model

In formalizing the path from policy to operational environment, the I-5 Model aids in planning the most appropriate strategy for a particular situation. Applying the model to military operations, this archetype assists in visualizing the military operating environment through presentation of the Milspace concept. Its applicability is broader and more flexible than present concepts and provides those involved in military related actions with a framework for the planning, execution, and analysis of current and future operations. In addition, the I-5 Model is a tool for the analysis of past operations. Figure 14 shows the application of the I-5 Model to this thesis' methodology.

Date	Event
02 August 1990	Iraq invades Kuwait
02 August	President Bush announces "aggression will not stand"
02 August	UN Resolution 660 demanding Iraqi withdrawal
08 August	President Bush demands Iraqi withdrawal
09 August	UN Resolution 662 declares Kuwaiti annexation null and void
25 August	UN Resolution 665 authorizing UN naval forces to enforce blockade of Iraq
16 September	President Bush speech to Iraqi people televised unedited in Iraq
29 November	UN Resolution 678 demands Iraqi withdrawal by 15 January 1991
04 January 1991	Iraqi Foreign Minister agrees to meet with U.S. Secretary of State
08 January	President Bush asks U.S. Congress to implement Resolution 678
09 January	Iraqi Foreign Minister/U.S. Secretary of State meeting
12 January	U.S. Congress passes resolution authorizing military force
17 January	Air campaign begins
24 February	Major ground war begins
27 February	Cease Fire

Figure 12. Major Events of Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm




Figure 13. I-5 Depiction of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm






Figure 14. Incorporation of I-5 Model into Thesis Methodology

### **Endnotes**

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army Command and Staff College. Joint and Combined Environments, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, August 1993, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United State, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>Milspace is a term coined by the author. The intent is to provide a definition of the military environment which accounts for combat and non-combat actions and overcomes the other limitations of Battle space as discussed in Chapter 2. The term Milspace (military operating space) removed the word battle from the traditionally used term to accommodate this concept.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CASE STUDIES**

#### **Introduction**

Chapter 5 applies this thesis' methodology to four case studies. Each study examines a different aspect of military operations and each varies in the degree of objective and end state definition. This approach non-quantitatively validates the thesis proposals through: (1) establishing the link between policy and force selection, (2) demonstrating the ability to choose appropriate forces from defined objectives, and, (3) showing how ill defined objectives lead to inappropriate force selection and mission misstep.

The first study, Operation Just Cause, the 1989 United States invasion of Panama concentrates on medium intensity combat operations. The process used to select forces for Just Cause closely follows the thesis methodology. The second study, Operation Restore Hope, examines US military deployment to Somalia in support of United Nations humanitarian efforts. Operation Restore Hope contains processes inconsistent with thesis proposals. The third study, Hurricane Andrew Relief Assistance, provides an example of military forces operating in a domestic non-combat environment, a type of operation expected to occupy more of the military's efforts. The final study applies thesis methodology to a future operation through examination of the Balkan crisis. Each case study begins with a background discussion followed by the identification of national strategy, military strategy, operational objectives, mission nodes and force requirements. Next was the development of matrices matching available forces to force requirements within the entry stage. The final section contains an analysis of the operation.

## Case Study I

### **Operation Just Cause: United States Action in Panama 1989**

#### Background

In 1989 the United States executed a surprise invasion of Panama in response to the actions of then Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega. The objective was the deposition of the strongman, restoration of democracy, and reestablishment of regional stability.

The operation consisted of 27 synchronized nearly simultaneous attacks at 11 different locations.<sup>1</sup> The achievement of most military objectives occurred within hours of the invasion with minimal US casualties. This operation ended in the capture of General Noriega and the reestablishment of regional stability. What is more important, this operation cogently demonstrated the translation of national strategy into successful military action.

#### National Strategy

Defined goals guided Operation Just Cause from the beginning. As provided by the National Security Council (NSC), national objectives were the restoration of democracy and the removal of Noriega from power. This immediately provided a well-defined end state. The national objectives easily transformed into four primary military strategic objectives--protection of US citizens, defense of the Panama canal, restoration of democracy, and capture of Noriega.

#### Military Strategy

General Colin Powell, then Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, converted the NSC mission statement into a mission for General Maxwell Thurman, the leader of the operation. The wording was as follows, "Conduct joint offensive operations to neutralize the PDF and other combatants, as required, so as to protect US lives, property, and interests in Panama and to assure the full treaty rights accorded by international law and

the U.S. Panama Canal treaties."<sup>2</sup> Also provided was a Joint Chiefs of Staff concept dividing the operation into three phases.<sup>3</sup> Phase 1, "combat operations at the onset designed to neutralize and fix in place the PDF, capture Noriega, install a new government, and protect and defend U.S. citizens and key facilities,"<sup>4</sup> constitutes the entry stage of the operation.

Military plans for achieving national objectives had been under study for some time. The final plan articulated operational objectives capable of defining specific tactical missions (nodes in the context of the proposed methodology).<sup>5</sup>

### Operational Objectives

Military strategic objectives drove the operational objectives. These operational objectives included:

1. Protection of U.S. Citizens
2. Defense of key Panama Canal facilities
3. Neutralization of the PDF
4. Neutralization of Dignity Battalion hoodlums
5. Capture of Noriega

The identification of these operational objectives initiated the tactical planning process. As listed below, certain conditions/restrictions applied:

1. Maximum surprise
2. Unify command structure
3. Minimize collateral damage
4. Use minimum force necessary
5. Plan no evacuation of non-combatants
6. Plan for post-combat operations to restore democracy

First, the plan was to achieve maximum surprise. This supported the conditions of minimizing collateral damage and planning for use of minimum force necessary.

Second, the operation required a unified command structure supportive of joint operations, a lesson learned from uncoupled US military action in Grenada. Third, there would be no evacuation of non-combatants. This constrained direct military action, however, would reduce the overall forces necessary for the operation. Finally, the planning was to consider post-conflict operations.

With these objectives and constraints in mind, the planners conceived a coup de main, the simultaneous attack of objectives throughout the theater of operations, targeting the following tactical objectives.

#### Mission Nodes

1. Ft. Cimarron (Bn 2000)
2. Tinasitas (1st Inf)
3. Torricos-Tocumen Airport (2nd Inf)
4. Ft. Amador (5th Rifle)
5. Rio Hato (6th and 7th Rifle)
6. Ft. Espinar (8th Rifle)
7. PDF Cavalry
8. Naval Infantry
9. Commendancia
10. Western approaches to Panama City/Bridge of the Americas
11. Balboa Harbor (PDF Patrol Craft)
12. Cerro Azul (TV Tower)
13. Madden Dam
14. Patilla Airport
15. Prison at Gamboa
16. Panama Canal Zone




Figure 15. Panama

### Military Forces

These tactical objectives, combined with intelligence estimates of enemy disposition and force strength, provided the planners with force requirement matrices as shown in Tables 4 and 5. Figure 16 shows the available theater forces at the time of operation, and Figure 17 shows the task organization of these forces. Table 6 matches the task organized forces to the mission objectives as executed during Operation Just Cause.

### Analysis

In planning for Operation Just Cause the sequence from national directive to force selection closely paralleled the methodology presented in this thesis. Defined objectives, consistent from the national level to the tactical, permitted the identification of appropriate forces for these objectives.

TABLE 4

## OPERATION JUST CAUSE ENTRY FORCE REQUIREMENTS

Mission	Environment	Opposition Forces	Own Forces
Objective			
Bn 2000	Ft. Cimarron		
1st Infantry	Tinasitas	200 man Inf	
2nd Infantry	Torricos-Tocumen Airport	200 man Inf	
5th Rifle	Ft. Amador	300 man MP	
6th and 7th Rifle	Rio Hato	400 man	
8th Rifle	Ft. Espinar	175 man	
PDF Calvary		150 man	
Naval Infantry			
Commendencia			
Western Approaches/ Bridge of the Americas			
Political Prisoners	Gamboa		
PDF Patrol Craft	Balboa Harbor		
TV Tower	Cerro Azul		
Madden Dam			
Patilla Airport			
Capture of Noriega			
Secure American Safety			



**TABLE 5**

**OPERATION JUST CAUSE FORCE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS**

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Force Support Element</b>	<b>Own Forces</b>
<b>Objective</b>		
<b>Neutralize PDF/ Hoodlums</b>	<b>Intelligence/ Security</b>	
<b>Airborne Delvry</b>	<b>Transportation</b>	
<b>Special Forces Delvry</b>	<b>Transportation</b>	
<b>Infantry Dlvry</b>	<b>Transportation</b>	
<b>Noriega Capture</b>	<b>Intelligence</b>	
<b>Special Forces</b>	<b>Transportation/Intelligence/Communications</b>	
<b>Protect US Citizens/ Defend Canal Zone</b>	<b>Transportation/Intelligence/Communications/Medical</b>	

### Army Forces, Panama

7th Inf Division (Light) (-)  
  HQ/HQ Company, 7th Division  
  7th MP Company (-)  
  2d Squadron, 9th Cavalry (-)  
  2d Bde, 7th Inf Division (-)  
    HQ/HQ Company, 2d Bde  
    5/21 Inf  
    3/27 Inf  
    6/8 Field Artillery  
    Battery A, 2/62 Air Defense Artillery  
    Company B, 13th Engineer Bn  
    Company B, 7th Medical Bn  
    Company B, 707th Maintenance Bn  
    Company B, 7th Supply and Transportation Bn  
127th Signal Bn (-)  
13th Engineer Bn (-)  
107th MI Bn (-)

### Air Forces, Panama

830th Air Division  
  1st Special Operations Wing (AC-130) Hurlburt Field, Fla.  
  24th Composite Wing  
  61st Military Airlift Group  
  Det. 1, 480th Recon Tech. Group

### Naval Forces, Panama

Naval Security Group (Galet Island)  
Mine Division 127

### Elements Under Direct Control of JTF-South

525th MI Bde (-)  
  Company A, 319th MI Bn  
  519th MI Bn (-)  
35th Signal Bde (-)

Figure 16. Theater Forces

1st Corps Support Command (-)  
44th Medical Bde  
41st Support Group  
46th Support Group (-)  
2d Support Center  
7th Transportation Bn  
4th Psychological Operations Group (-)  
96th Civil Affairs Bn  
1109th Signal Bde  
1st Battlefield Control Detachment (-)  
HQ/HQ Company, U.S. Army South  
16th MP Bde  
470th MI Bde

Figure 16. Theater Forces (continued)

**Task Force Atlantic**

HQ/HQ Company, 3d Bde, 7th Inf Div  
4/17 Inf  
3/504 Inf (Abn)  
Battery B, 7/15 Field Artillery  
Battery B, 2/62 Air Defense  
Company C, 13th Eng Bn  
Company C, 7th Medical Bn  
Company C, 707th Maintenance Bn  
Company C, 7th Supply and Trans. Bn

**Task Force Wolf**

HQ 1/82 Avn, 82d Abn Division  
1/82 Avn (-)

**Task Force Semper Fi**

6th Marine Expeditionary Bn  
Company K, 3/6 Marines  
Company I, 3/6 Marines  
Company D, 2d Light Armored Inf Bn (-)  
1st Pltn, First Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team  
Marine Corps Security Force Company  
534th Military Police Co. (Army)  
536th Engineer Bn (Army)  
Battery D, 320th Field Artillery (Army)  
2/27 Inf (-) (Army)

**Task Force Bayonet**

HQ/HQ Company, 193d Inf Brigade  
5/87 Inf  
1/508 Inf (Abn)  
4/6 Inf (M), 5th Inf Division (M)  
59th Engineer Co  
519th MP Bn

**Figure 17. Operation Just Cause Task Force Organization**

### Joint Special Operations Task Force

#### Task Force Red (HQ 75th Ranger Regt)

HQ/HQ Company, 75th Rgr

1/75 Rgr

2/75 Rgr

3/75 Rgr

#### Task Force Green (Army Delta Force)

#### Task Force Blue (Navy Special Mission Unit)

#### 7th SF Grp (-) (Arrived D +10)

HQ/HQ Company, 7th SF Grp

1/7 SF Grp (-)

2/7 SF Grp

Support Company, 7th SF Grp

112 Signal Bn (-)

528th Support Bn

160th Aviation Grp (-)

617th Aviation Detachment

#### Task Force Black(HQ 3/7 Special Forces Grp)

3/7 SF Grp

Company A, 1/7 SF Grp

#### Task White (HQ Nav. Spec. Warfare Grp 2)

Teams 2, 4 Nav. Spec War. Grp 2

Naval Special Warfare Unit 8

Special Boat Unit 26

### Task Force Pacific

#### 82d Airborne Div (-)

HQ/HQ Company, 82d Abn Division (-)

1st Bde, 82d Abn Division (+)

1/504 Inf (Abn)

2/504 Inf (Abn)

4/325 Inf (Abn) (-) (+)

Battery A, 3/319 Field Artillery (-)

Battery A, 3/4 Air Defense Artillery (-)

Company C, 3/73 Armor

Company A, 307th Engineer Bn

Company A, 782d Maintenance Bn

Company B, 307th Medical Bn

Company A, 407th Supply and Service Bn

Company A, 313th MI Bn

Figure 17. Operation Just Cause Task Force Organization (continued)

Company B, 82d Signal Bn (-)  
82d MP Company (-)  
401st MP Company  
511th MP Company  
1st Bde, 7th Inf Division (Manchus)  
    HQ/HQ Company, 1st Bde  
    1/9 Inf  
    2/9 Inf  
    3/9 Inf  
    Company A, 13th Engineer Bn  
    Company A, 707th Maintenance Bn  
    Company A, 7th Medical Bn  
    Company A, 7th Supply and Service Bn

Task Force Aviation

1/228 Avn  
Task Force Hawk (HQ 3/123 Avn, 7th Inf Div)  
3/123 Avn (-)

Figure 17. Operation Just Cause Task Force Organization (continued)

**TABLE 6**  
**OPERATION JUST CAUSE FORCE ASSIGNMENTS**

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Environment</b>	<b>Opposition Forces</b>	<b>Own Forces</b>
<b>Objective</b>			<b>Presence/Parity/ Superiority/ Supremecy</b>
<b>Bn 2000</b>	<b>Ft. Cimarron</b>		<b>TF Pacific</b>
<b>1st Infantry</b>	<b>Tinasitas</b>	<b>200 man Inf</b>	<b>TF Pacific</b>
<b>2nd Infantry</b>	<b>Torricos-Tocumen Airport</b>	<b>200 man Inf</b>	<b>Joint Special Operations TF</b>
<b>5th Rifle</b>	<b>Ft. Amador</b>	<b>300 man MP</b>	<b>TF Bayonet</b>
<b>6th and 7th Rifle</b>	<b>Rio Hato</b>	<b>400 man</b>	<b>Joint Special Operations TF</b>
<b>8th Rifle</b>	<b>Ft. Espinar</b>	<b>175 man</b>	<b>TF Atlantic</b>
<b>PDF Calvary</b>		<b>150 man</b>	<b>TF Bayonet</b>
<b>Naval Infantry</b>			<b>TF Atlantic</b>
<b>Commendencia</b>			
<b>Western Approaches/ Bridge of the Americas</b>			<b>TF Semper Fi</b>
<b>Political Prisoners</b>	<b>Gamboa</b>		<b>TF Atlantic</b>
<b>PDF Patrol Craft</b>	<b>Balboa Harbor</b>		<b>Joint Special Operations TF</b>
<b>TV Tower</b>	<b>Cerro Azul</b>		<b>Joint Special Operation TF</b>
<b>Madden Dam</b>			<b>Joint Special Operations TF</b>
<b>Patilla Airport</b>			<b>Joint Special Operations TF</b>
<b>Capture of Noriega</b>			<b>Joint Special Operations TF</b>
<b>Secure American Safety</b>			<b>TF Atlantic</b>

## Case Study 2

### **Operation Restore Hope: United States Efforts in Somalia**

#### Background

In January 1991, fighting between government troops and Somali National Movement insurgents forced Somali President Siad Barre to leave office. This was the continuation of a long term struggle for national political power. Siad Barre's downfall resulted in a violent power struggle and clan clashes throughout the country.<sup>6</sup> In the capital of Mogadishu intense fighting between the two major factions, those supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and those supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress General Mohamed Farah Aideed, continued to drive the country to chaos.

UN action to this point consisted of humanitarian efforts in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations.<sup>7</sup> The deteriorating situation led to escalated United Nations involvement.

A team of senior UN officials visited Somalia in January 1992 and received unanimous support for cease fire negotiations from all Somali factions. This resulted in UN Resolution 733 (1992) urging all parties to cease hostilities and calling for all States to implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali invited the Somali parties as well as the League of Arab States (LAU), Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Islamic Conference to UN headquarters to participate in consultations at UN headquarters.

The United Nations negotiated a cease fire under the auspices of the LAU, OAU and the Islamic Conference; however, these parties agreeing to the cease fire controlled only 4,000 of 20,000 armed fighters in Mogadishu.<sup>8</sup> On 25 July 1992, the first UN military observers arrived in Somalia in accordance with UN Resolution 751. This resolution called for 50 observers to monitor the UN truce. On 12 August 1992, Somali warlord Mohamed






Figure 18. Somalia

Aideed stated that armed UN forces could protect UN food supplies. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali followed this by announcing the deployment of 500 additional UN soldiers to Somalia.

Then U.S. President Bush ordered a food airlift to Somalia. On 17 August 1992, three days after this announcement, U.S. troops and aircraft arrived in Mombassa, Kenya, to prepare for relief efforts. On 28 August, the UN Security Council authorized an additional 3,500 men to protect aid convoys. General Aideed agreed to the deployment of 3000 UN troops; however, he requested the 2,100 Marines stationed off the coast of

Somalia be removed. On 14 September, 40 man contingent of Pakistani troops arrived in Mogadishu as part of a UN force eventually totalling 550.

On 21 October, Somali clans conducted a series of antagonistic events including the shooting of a U.S. C-130 relief aircraft, looting of a UN warehouse, and the demand of landing fees from humanitarian flights. This resulted in the closing of the Mogadishu airport. General Aideed prohibited Pakistani forces from guarding the airport, piers, or food convoys. On 10 November, Pakistani forces reassumed control of the airport.

On 21 November, the Deputy Committee of the National Security Council, on the basis of a recommendation by then Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, decided in favor of U.S. intervention. This decision, according to the press, resulted from; (1) the scale of human disaster in Somalia, and, (2) the realization that the U.S. was the only world power able to do something about it.<sup>9</sup>

Direct U.S. military involvement began on 9 December 1992 when U.S. Marines and Navy Seals landed in Somalia supporting UN efforts. Forward elements of the French Foreign Legion arriving from Djibouti joined the U.S. forces.<sup>10</sup> The landing was uncontested and without casualties. The landing force took charge of the port area and international airport in Mogadishu.

On 10 December, a Marine force occupied the abandoned Soviet facility at Bale Dogle, half way between Mogadishu and Baidoa.<sup>11</sup> Marines continued on to Baidoa and secured the airfield there on 15 December.

Following these entry operations, follow-on forces arrived in country. These included the Army's 10th Mountain Division, Navy Beach Group, Navy Construction Battalion, and Navy Construction Regiment.<sup>12</sup>

### National Strategy

Although the situation in Somalia deteriorated over an extended period, the decision to involve U.S. forces transpired as a result of two events. Arguably the first was the UN

and press publication of the mass starvation in country. The second was the UN acceptance of a protection mission for food distribution and the US support of this mission. In December 1992, President Bush announced the decision to commit troops other than those involved in airlift operations. In an Address to the Nation, he added that "[the United States would be] willing to provide more help to enable relief to be delivered,"<sup>13</sup> and publicized the presence of a Marine Amphibious Ready Group off the coast of Mogadishu. He also indicated the commitment of troops from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Army's 10th Mountain Division.

### Military Strategy

In his speech the President stated what the forces would do. In conjunction with coalition partners: (1) "We [US] will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia, so that food can move from ships over land to the people..."<sup>14</sup>, and (2) "Once we [US] have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops handing the security mission back to a regular U.N. peacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective-to open the supply routes, to get the food moving and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving."<sup>15</sup>

A Department of State Dispatch of 21 December 1992, further solidified this mission statement.

The mission of the US-led coalition to Somalia is specific and limited: to create the security environment necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief to the Somali people. The US military force will secure ports, airports, and delivery routes and will protect storage and distribution of humanitarian supplies. US forces will remain in Somalia only as long as they are needed. Once objectives are met, the coalition force will depart, transferring its security function to UN peace-keepers.<sup>16</sup>

### Operational Objectives

This dispatch reiterated the Presidents strategic objectives and translated them into military objectives--securing ports, airfields, distribution centers, and routes. The dispatch classification of this mission as a security mission aiding a humanitarian mission,

not a humanitarian mission in itself, requires attention. The Analysis section discusses this significance.

### Mission Nodes

These military objectives convert into the following mission areas or nodes:

1. Initial enlodgement (beachhead or land enlodgement)
2. Mogadishu airport
3. Port area of Mogadishu
4. Safe transit corridors

### Military Forces

Unlike most military operations which desire surprise of the enemy, this entry counted on knowledge of the U.S. military's arrival. The planners hoped for an intimidation factor that would deflate any desire to provide resistance. Table 7 presents the Force requirements for entry operations initiating Operation Restore Hope. Available forces included a Marine Ready Group, the Army's 82d Airborne Division, and Special Forces units. Table 8 matches ready forces to operational objectives.

### Analysis

A different application of the model might classify the U.S. involvement in Restore Hope as a combat operation. This would be supportive of the stated mission to "create a security environment."<sup>17</sup> Either way the military would stand ready to act in a hostile environment.

Operation Restore Hope emphasizes the importance of congruity from the national level through the tactical level of military operations when planning force selection. The decision to commit U.S. forces to Somalia followed a logical path with defined objectives at the national and military level through the selection of objectives.

**TABLE 7**

**OPERATION RESTORE HOPE ENTRY FORCE REQUIREMENTS**

Mission	Environment	Opposition Forces	Own Forces
			Supremecy
Initial Enlodgement	Beachhead	Clan militia	
Mogandishu	Airport	Clan militia	
Mogandishu	Port	Clan militia	
Transit corridors	Urban areas	Clan militia	

**TABLE 8**

**OPERATION RESTORE HOPE FORCE ASSIGNMENTS 1,2,3**

Mission	Environment	Opposition Forces	Own Forces
			Supremecy
Initial Enlodgement	Beachhead	Clan militia	Marine Ready Group/ Navy SEALS
Mogandishu	Airport	Clan militia	Marine Ready Group/ Navy SEALS
Mogandishu	Port	Clan militia	Marine Ready Group/ Navy SEALS
Transit corridors	Urban areas	Clan militia	Marine Ready Group

Note 1. All information is unclassified. Special forces activities which may have occurred other than that noted are not discussed.

Note 2. Forces discussed are for entry operations only and do not include follow on forces which arrived through Mogadishu Airport after initial Marine activity.

Note 3. Force Support requirements are not discussed based on the organic support of a Marine Group.

Further review of events in Somalia reveals a shift in policy without a reappraisal of military requirements. Subsequently, American and U.N. forces sustained casualties.

The United Nations, the President, and the press portrayed U.N. actions in Somalia as humanitarian relief efforts. President Bush specifically stated, "Let me be very clear, our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation."<sup>18</sup> Yet this is not the mission given the military. From the President's speech the military mission was to "create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia."<sup>19</sup> Though not necessarily a contradiction of the first objective, there is a significant difference in focus between the two statements. Forces entering a humanitarian effort might be expected to perform tasks supportive of the Army definition of humanitarian assistance--"the use of DOD personnel, equipment, and supplies to promote human welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters."<sup>20</sup> This implies a benign environment devoid of combat operations. On the other hand, security efforts, not addressed in Army doctrine, indicate an environment potentially requiring the use of force.

This dichotomy resulted in inappropriate forces for Operation Restore Hope, specifically in the area of armored vehicles. Application of the I-5 Model to this scenario indicates the reason for this miscue. The model classifies the military aspect of a humanitarian effort as a non-combat operation. The Military element of Force Support would provide any required security support. This military element would engage in any combat activity required to support humanitarian relief, but in itself not classified as a humanitarian effort.

### Case Study 3

#### **Hurricane Andrew Relief Efforts**

##### Background

On 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew came ashore south of Miami, Florida. The storm continued across the southern tip of Florida, entered the Gulf of Mexico, and then made landfall a second time on 26 August near Morgan City, Louisiana.

As a result of the hurricane's damage, President Bush declared a major disaster under the Stafford Act and authorized federal relief first in Florida then Louisiana.<sup>21</sup> The relief efforts comprised the largest ever Continental United States (CONUS) deployment of military members involving over 24,000 U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen, plus a contingency of Canadian forces.<sup>22</sup> These forces successfully completed 99 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) taskings clearing six million cubic yards of debris, constructing four life support centers, establishing and operating three depots and a donated goods reception point to receive, store, and dispensing humanitarian goods. Additionally, the military provided 67,000 civilians with medical care and repaired 98 schools.<sup>23</sup>

##### National Strategy

The Department of Defense Executive Agent, the Secretary of the Army, designated the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Forces Command (CINCFOR) as the Operating Agent and the Supported CINC for disaster relief efforts.<sup>24</sup> CINCFOR conducted disaster relief in support of FEMA.<sup>25</sup> CINCFOR supported all Emergency Support Functions except for Public Works and Engineering, the responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.<sup>26</sup> Members of all U.S. armed services as well as Canadians deployed from 24 August to 15 October. Although Louisiana fell under the disaster act, the damage in that state did not warrant deployment of major military units.

### Military Strategy

The military was a supporting agency for FEMA and received objectives from that agency according to the Presidential directive. These objectives fell under the categories of:

1. Debris removal
2. Tentage provision
3. Establishment of Life Support Centers
4. School Repair
5. Medical Support
6. Establishment of Emergency Feeding Sites
7. Providing Personnel Augmentation
8. Providing Aviation Support
9. Conduct of Damage Reconnaissance and Assessment
10. General Equipment Support
11. Emergency Electrical Power, and,
12. Establishment of Laundry Facilities

The Joint Task Force, JTF Andrew, translated the national and FEMA objectives into the following Concept of Operations:

To simultaneously operate in three AO's; forces centered on the communities in existence prior to the disaster incorporating all available support systems across a broad front. The objective is to make the communities an integral part of the recovery process thus establishing a system which can be readily perpetuated following DoD involvement. Counterpart military, mayors and civil A teams will be established to facilitate communication and coordination. The operation will be conducted in three phases.<sup>27</sup>

### Mission Nodes

Joint Task Force Andrew conceived the following mission statement:

Beginning 28 Aug. 1992, Joint Task Force Andrew establishes humanitarian support operations vicinity Miami, Florida in the relief effort following Hurricane Andrew. The Task Force will establish field feeding sites,



storage/distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operation, local/line haul transportation ops, and other logistical support to local population.<sup>28</sup>

The military planned a three-phase operation.<sup>29</sup> Phase I provided relief operations including the basic life support systems of food, water, shelter, medical services and supplies, and sanitation. Phase II, recovery operations, ensured sustainment of those services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, State, and Local authorities with a means to reestablish public services. Phase III addressed reconstitution, the re-establishment of public services under control of non-DoD Federal, State, and Local governments while JTF Andrew disestablished. Phase I is considered the entry operation. Using these directives, concepts and missions the Table 9 presents the force requirements for Phase I.

#### Military Forces

FEMA requested equipment in support of the relief efforts as early as 25 August. The military did not receive requests for forces until 27 August.<sup>30</sup> Responding to the call for manpower, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Canadians sent the forces listed in Figure 19.<sup>31</sup> Table 10 provides an example of force requirement/force availability matching. This table does not show the actual tasking of particular units during Florida relief effort.

#### Analysis

The Joint Lessons Learned Long Report (JULLS), recounting the Hurricane Andrew Operation, addresses the force selection process.<sup>32</sup> The document contends a generalized lack of knowledge regarding the capabilities and uses of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. The report suggests the JOPES system to be "unresponsive and cumbersome as a planning/execution tool, mainly due to misunderstandings as to what data were required, how the information was inputted into the system, and how the system was used to plan, schedule and track events."<sup>33</sup>

**TABLE 9**

**HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF EFFORT ENTRY FORCE REQUIREMENTS**

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Force Support Element</b>	<b>Own Forces</b>
Field Feeding	Logistics-Sustainability	
Storage/ Distribution	Logistics-Sustainability/Transportation	
Cargo Transfer	Logistics-Sustainability/Transportation	
Local/Line Haul Transportation	Logistics-Transportation	
Medical Support	Logistics-Medical/Transportation	
Water	Logistic-Sustainability	
Shelter	Logistic-Engineering	
Sanitation	Logistic-Sustainability	
Laundry Svcs.	Logistic-Sustainability	
Military/ Civilian Linkage	Political-Public Affairs/Civil Affairs	
C2	Communications	
Debris Removal	Logistic-Sustainability/Engineering/Manpower	
Building Repair	Logistic-Engineering/Manpower	
Aviation Support	Logistic-Transportation/Medical	
Emergency Electrical Power	Logistic-Sustainability/Engineering	
Damage Recon and Assessment	Logistic-Sustainability/Engineering Intelligence	
Security	Military-Security	

HQ, FORSCOM  
USACE Prime Power Bn

USATWO

Defense Coord Officer/Defense Coord Elem

JTF Andrew

Army Forces (ARFOR)

HQ, XVII: Abn Corps  
TF All American  
Assault CP, 82d Abn Div  
TF Falcon (2d Bde, 82d Abn)  
TF 27 (DS) (Engineers)  
519th MP Bn (-)  
Corps Support Gp (Provost) (DS)  
TF Mountain  
10th Mtn Div (LT) (-)  
937th Engr Gp (DS)  
841st Engr Bn (CBT) (USAR)  
503d MP Bn (-) (DS)  
507th CSG (-) (DS) (GS ARFOR)  
18th Avn Bde  
20th Engr Bde  
16th MP Bde  
35th Sig Bde  
1st COSCOM  
361st CA Bde (-) (USAR)  
1st PSYOP Bn (-)  
18th PSG (-)  
18th CFG (-)  
C/1-7 SFG (A) (-)  
Special Troops Bn (-)  
314th Press Camp HQ (-) (USAR)  
USAMC Logistic Support Group (Prov)  
AMC Depot Cmd  
80th OD Bn (-) OPCON

Figure 19. Available Forces for Hurricane Andrew Relief Efforts

**Navy Forces (NAVFOR)**

**TF 28**

USS Sylvainia (AFS 2)

USS Ponce (LPD 15)

USS Hunley (AS 31)

USS Sierra (AD 18)

USS Opportune (ARS 41)

USS Ashland (LSD 48)

Naval Mobile Construction Bn 1 (Reinforced Air Det)

Naval Mobile Construction Bn 4 (Reinforced Air Det)

Naval Mobile Construction Bn 14 (Reinforced Air Det)

Construction Bn Units 410, 420, 412, 419

Amphibious Construction Bn 2

COMPHIBRON SIX

HC-8 (Embarked on USS Sylvainia and USS Ponce)

**Marine Forces (MARFOR) (OPCON to ARFOR)**

**SPMAGTF**

**HQ, II MEF**

2d MAR Div (-)

2d FSSG (-)

2d SRIG (-)

2d MAW (-)

CA Gp (-), 4th MARDIV (USMCR)

**Air Forces (AFFOR)**

31st TFW (Coordination)

310th ARR Sqdn

41st ARR Sqdn

**Canadian Forces (CANFOR)**

Canadian Combined TF

Airfield Engr Sqdn (-)

Mobile Repair Tm

HMCS Protectuer

**USAFIVE**

Defense Coord Officer/Defense Coord Elem

990th Med Det (AAMBL) (-) (USAR)

**Figure 19. Available Forces for Hurricane Andrew Relief Efforts (continued)**

TABLE 10

## HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF EFFORTS NOMINAL FORCE ASSIGNMENTS

Mission	Force Support Element	Own Forces
Field Feeding	Logistics-Sustainability	TF All American
Storage/ Distribution	Logistics-Sustainability/Transportation	AMC Depot/ TF Falcon/ 519th MP
Cargo Transfer	Logistics-Sustainability/Transportation	TF Falcon
Local/Line Haul Transportation	Logistics-Transportation	10th Mtn Div
Medical Support	Logistics-Medical/Transportation	990th Med Det/ USS Ponce/USS Ashland
Water	Logistic-Sustainability	837th Engr Grp USS Hunley
Shelter	Logistic-Engineering	SPMGTF 2d FSSG
Sanitation	Logistic-Sustainability	20th Engr Bde
Laundry Svcs.	Logistic-Sustainability	USS Sierra/ USS Hunley/ TF Falcon
Military/ Civilian Linkage	Political-Public Affairs/Civil Affairs	1st PSYOP/ 361st CA Bde/ 314th Press Camp HQ
C2	Communications	35th Sig
Debris Removal	Logistic-Sustainability/Engineering/Manpower	TF Falcon/TF 28/ TF All American
Building Repair	Logistic-Engineering/Manpower	Naval Mobile Const Bn
Aviation Support	Logistic-Transportation/Medical	18th Avn Bde/ HC-8/ 990th Med Det
Emergency Electrical Power	Logistic-Sustainability/Engineering	Naval Construction Bn/ Amphibious

		Construction Bn
Damage Recon and Assessment	Logistic-Sustainability/Engineering Intelligence	20th Engr Bde/ Naval Construction Bns
Security	Military-Security	16th MP Bde

As suggested in the report, the hasty deployment of units resulted in a less than optimum selection of forces. This required the subsequent deployment of additional forces more suited to the mission. The effect was inefficient use of available assets. The report implies this problem as a fault in military planning and not related to higher directives or mission statements.<sup>34</sup>

The JULLS assessment appears valid. The process delineating the military mission was adequate in providing appropriate guidance. The shortcoming was the hasty influx of military forces before delineation of the military mission. Once developed, the mission statement established force selection criteria indicating the needed forces. The thesis' methodology requires the envisionment of a mission statement before force selection. Conceptualization of such a plan prevents the premature deployment of non-tailored forces as experienced during Hurricane Andrew relief effort. The exception would be a situation requiring hasty response at the expense of an optimal solution.

A concern of domestic military deployments is the role of service members in police activity. The I-5 Model accounts for this dilemma. Examining Hurricane Andrew operations, the model would consider this as a non-combat operation. The security aspect of the Force Support Military element would provide the means for employment of Military Police. To address how these Military Police would conduct security operations under these conditions, a discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act is necessary. This act prohibits the use of active duty Army and Air Force personnel from enforcing U.S. laws or directly assisting a civilian law enforcement agency.<sup>35</sup> DoD Directive 5525.5 prohibits the

Navy and Marine Corps from such activity.<sup>36</sup> Any security measures necessary would be according to Posse Comitatus and DoD 5525.5.

#### Case Study 4

##### **Application of Proposed Methodology to the Balkan Conflict**

The following discussion applies the proposed methodology to the present conflict in Yugoslavia. With the exception of the background discussion, all ideas are hypothetical (National strategy, Military strategy, Military Objectives, etc.), based on unclassified literature and presented to demonstrate a theoretical application of the ideas proposed in this thesis. The format used is similar to the previous studies.

#### Background

This section provides a summary of events leading to the current situation in the Balkans. As of this writing, U.S. Naval forces patrol the Adriatic Sea; and U.S. aircraft, in accordance with NATO ultimatums, have engaged in anti-air and strike operations.

Background information is from The Yugoslavia Conflict: A Chronology of Events.<sup>37</sup>

In January of 1990, during a meeting of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)--Extraordinary 14th Congress, the Slovenian delegation walked out, adjourning the proceedings and ending the LCY era. A move away from Communism throughout the first part of 1990, led to the 7 September 1990 Albanian Yugoslav proclamation of independence for the province of Kosovo. On 18 September, Serbia abolished self-rule in adjoining Kosovo and Vojvodina.

In October 1990, Croatia and Slovenia proposed a restructuring of Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states; and in November, the LCY reorganized in attempted to defend Yugoslavia as a federation. In December of 1990, the following events occurred: the dissolution of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) party organization, the prohibition of political activities and organizations within the military,




Figure. 20 The Former Yugoslavia

Alija Izetbegovic's appointment as president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the declaration of sovereignty by Slovenia.

In January of 1991, the Yugoslav state presidency instructed the military to disarm illegal paramilitary groups. Also, the Federal Constitutional Court annulled Slovenia's declaration of sovereignty. The Croatian Minister of Defense put Croatian defense forces on full alert, and in response, the YPA demanded the arrest of the Defense Minister.

In February Slovenia passed a plan to secede, Croatia passed a law giving Croatian law precedence over Yugoslavian law, and the Serbian National Council declared Serbs in Croatia independent. In March, after the collective presidency's refusal to authorize a military response against anti-Communist protesters in Belgrade, Yugoslav President Jovic resigned. Later that month, Serbs in Krajina where one third of Croatia's



Serbs live, announced their plans to secede from Croatia. Serbian President Milosevic followed with threats to arm Croatian Serbs unless paramilitary formations in Serbia disarmed. At the end of the month, Serbs ambushed Croatian police. This caused the April establishment of the Croatian National Guard Corps, a de facto Croatian Army. The escalation of violence led to YPA intervention to prevent clashes. Krajina Serbs then established a "parliament" for union with Serbia.

The YPA appealed to the Yugoslav collective presidency to end the increasing fighting between ethnic groups or give the YPA power to impose order. On 9 May, Yugoslavia's federal presidency agreed to a series of measures to help defuse interrepublic conflicts. A subsequent referendum in Krajina announced an intention by the Krajina Serbs to leave Croatia and join Serbia. On 15 May, after the State Presidency failed to elect a President, Croat Stipe Mesic assumed office. The European Community warned Yugoslav leaders against staging a military coup. At the end of May, a Croat referendum approved sovereignty within a confederated Yugoslavia.

In June of 1991, the presidents of Yugoslavia's six republics agreed to transform Yugoslavia into a loose federation of sovereign republics. On the 25 June, Croatian and Slovenian legislatures declared independence. In response, the YPA began armed intervention in Slovenia to seize border posts and the airport.

On 7-8 July, European Community (EC) representatives held talks with federal and republic leaders, resulting in the Brioni Declaration "Common Declaration on the Peaceful Resolution of the Yugoslav Crisis." On the 18 July, the combined presidencies voted the YPA be withdrawn from Slovenia. After increased fighting in eastern Croatia, the EC increased its unarmed observer team from 50 to up to 500. In August, the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared neutrality.

September of 1991 was a period of great escalation. After the six republics signed the EC cease-fire, fighting intensified in eastern Croatia. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) passed a resolution on arms embargo to

Yugoslavia. On 8 September, 95 percent of Macedonians voted for independence, and sovereignty followed by a declaration of independence. The declaration of an Autonomous Region of Krajina came next, and Bosnia-Herzegovina ordered mobilization of territorial defense personnel. On the 25 September, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. At the end of the month, the YPA launched a major offensive in Croatia.

On 7 October the Yugoslav Air Force bombed the Croatian capital of Zagreb. Also on this date, Slovenia broke all ties with Yugoslavia. On 14 October, the Bosnian National Assembly approved a memorandum on sovereignty and independence; and on the 17th, the YPA launched another major offensive in Croatia. On 27 October, Muslims in the Sandjak region of Serbia conduct a referendum favoring autonomy. The next day the EC issued an ultimatum to Serbia to transform Yugoslavia into an association of sovereign republics.

The YPA intensified its activities and occupied Vukovar. On 20 November Bosnia-Herzegovina President Izetbegovic requested UN troops for border protection. The end of the year saw Federal State President Mesic resign his "irrelevant" position and the US Department of State imposing economic sanctions on Yugoslavia.

In January of 1992, the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia following Germany's lead. Other European states followed suit. Macedonia created a national army. On 23 February, Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian leaders agreed to a loose federal system in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The following events occurred in March 1992: Montenegro passed a referendum to remain in the Yugoslav state with Serbia; the first UN peacekeeping troops arrived in Croatia; leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed on reshaping political and constitutional makeup, and the YPA completed its evacuation of Macedonia.

Most of April 1992's activity centered on Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early part of the month, violence increased. On 6 April, the EC recognized the republic followed by

the US recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia. The following day the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence, resulting in a state of emergency declaration by the presidency. Fighting escalated in Sarajevo, and the Bosnian government ordered the withdrawal of the Serb-dominated federal army from the republic. Proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which included Serbia and Montenegro, occurred on 27 April.

The "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" appointed a government, presidency, and army on 12 May. By the end of May, the Yugoslav Air Force and the federal army were withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia announced a formal military alliance on 16 June. Serbian police prevented the parliament of the self proclaimed Republic of Kosovo from assembling on 24 June. On 28 June, the second in a series of mass demonstrations calling for peace and the ouster of Milosevic, occurred. Two days later, the United States announced its willingness to provide naval and air cover for relief efforts to Sarajevo.

In July, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina announced the formation of "Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna." A Serbian offensive in Bosnia followed. On 27 July, EC sponsored talks on Bosnia started.

August began with Russian recognition of Macedonia. United States President Bush called on the UN Security Council to authorize "the use of all necessary measures" to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 August. The US Senate then passed a resolution backing the use of force to protect relief missions. On 12 August, the "Serbian Republic" in Bosnia and the "Serbian Republic of Krajina" announced an intention to unify. On 13 August, the UN authorized "all necessary measures" to ensure humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and condemned "ethnic cleansing." On 14 August, NATO ruled out massive use of ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the end of the month, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution urging the Security Council to take "further appropriate measures" to end fighting and "ethnic cleansing" in

**Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UN-EC sponsored a long-term peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina on 29 August.**

**The following sections are the authors' views only. Any policy or strategy statement is theoretical and not from official publications.**

### **National Strategy**

**In support of national security strategy objectives as listed in 1993 National Security Strategy, the United States will engage in extended operations in the former Yugoslavia to restore regional stability, foster open democratic and representative political systems that secure human rights and respect for every citizen, and lead in a collective response in support of United Nation, NATO, and other internationally accepted resolutions.**

**This strategy converts to the following national objectives: (1) the establishment of a secure environment to allow for reinstitution of stable political and economic infrastructure, (2) re-establishment of basic resources and support of internal forces responsible for the stability of the region, and (3) subsequent turnover of security operations to national organizations.**

### **Military Strategy**

**The military strategy for the Balkans translates to--conduct of extended operations in the former Yugoslavia to establish and maintain a secure environment, aid in the re-establishment of infrastructure, and support the transfer of security operations to national organizations according to United States, United Nations, NATO, and other internationally accepted directives. This is in concert with the January 1992 National Military Strategy of the United States objective of a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.**

**The military operation is multi-phased. Phase I-entry and establishment of initial secure enlodgements; Phase II-Reenforcement of enlodgements, expansion of security**

zones and acceptance of follow-on forces; Phase III-maintenance of security zones, re-establishment of infrastructure; Phase IV-transfer of internal security duties to national organizations, continuation of infrastructure development; and Phase V-redeployment and support of long-term peacekeeping duties in accordance with U.N. and NATO resolutions. Phase I constitutes entry operations.

### Objectives

The operational objectives foreseen for Phase I include:

1. Secure and ensure use of required ports and airfields
2. Secure and ensure use of transit corridors between enlodgements
3. Secure airspace
4. Neutralize any opposing forces interfering with security zone establishment

The following restrictions and conditions apply:

1. Minimize collateral damage
2. Plan no evacuation of non-combatants
3. Anticipate the presence of civilians in security areas
4. Anticipate interaction with UN, NATO and national militia.

### Mission Nodes

Considering objectives and conditions, the following mission nodes exist:

1. International airport at Sarajevo
2. Port facilities at Dubrovnik
3. A safe corridor connecting Dubrovnik and Sarajevo
4. Airspace supremacy
5. Naval supremacy

Table 11 presents combat force requirements for Phase I operations.

TABLE 11

## FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PHASE I BALKAN OPERATIONS

Mission	Environment	Opposition Forces	Own Forces
			Supremecy
Sarajevo Airport	Airport and Facilities	Artillery/ Guerilla/ Terrorist/ Regular Army/ Armor/ Air	
Sarajevo Security Zone	Urban Environment	Artillery/ Guerilla/ Terrorist/ Regular Army/ Armor/ Air	
Port of Dubrovnik	Urban and Littoral	Artillery/ Guerilla/ Terrorist/ Regular Army/ Armor/ Air and Naval	
Transit Corridor	Urban and Rural	Artillery/ Guerilla/ Terroist/ Regular Army/ Armor/ Air	
Yugoslav Airspace		Air/ Anti-Air	
Littoral Waters		Surface/ Air	

Forces

For this study, all forces listed in Appendix A are available. Table 12 illustrates a hypothetical assignment forces for Phase I operations.

Analysis

Using the thesis' methodology, the ability exists to transition from national strategy to appropriate force selection. This assumes establishment of defined objectives and end state, and requires direct linkage between policy and force tailoring. Though conducted in a sterile enviroment, using the Balkan situation as an example, the basic principles of the thesis appear valid.

**TABLE 12**

**FORCE ASSIGNMENTS FOR PHASE I BALKAN OPERATIONS**

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Environment</b>	<b>Opposition Forces</b>	<b>Own Forces</b>
			<b>Supremecy</b>
<b>Sarajevo Airport</b>	<b>Airport and Facilities</b>	<b>Artillery/ Guerilla/ Terrorist/ Regular Army/ Armor/ Air</b>	<b>Army Airborne/ Rangers/ Special Forces/ Army Aviation/ MP/ Artillery/ Air Def./Engineer/ AF AC-130</b>
<b>Sarajevo Security Zone</b>	<b>Urban Environment</b>	<b>Artillery/ Guerilla/ Terrorist/ Regular Army/ Armor/ Air</b>	<b>Mechanized Inf/ Air Assault/ Armored Cavalry/ MP/ Engineer</b>
<b>Port of Dubrovnik</b>	<b>Urban and Littoral</b>	<b>Artillery/ Guerilla/ Terrorist/ Regular Army/ Armor/ Air and Naval</b>	<b>Marine Armor/ Marine Infantry/ Air Defense/ Artillery/ MP</b>
<b>Transit Corridor</b>	<b>Urban and Rural</b>	<b>Artillery/ Guerilla/ Terrorist/ Regular Army/ Armor/ Air</b>	<b>Mech Infantry/ Armor/ Armored Cavalry/ Air Def.</b>
<b>Yugoslav Airspace</b>		<b>Air/ Anti-Air</b>	<b>Air Force and Navy AI/ BAI Air Defense</b>
<b>Littoral Waters</b>		<b>Surface/ Air</b>	<b>Navy CVBG</b>

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>National Defense University, AFSC PUB 2: Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, p. II-5-E-7.

<sup>2</sup>Flanagan, Edward, Jr., LTGEN, (USA Ret), Battle for Panama, McClean VA: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1993, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Arriving at the final plan was not a simple process. General Flanagan's book describes the controversy surrounding the plan development.

<sup>6</sup>UN Reference Paper, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, UN Dept. of Public Information, 30 April 1993, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Clarke, Walter S., Somalia Background Information for Operation Restore Hope. Department of National Security and Strategy. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December, 1992, p. 35.

<sup>9</sup>Oberdorfer, Don, "The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could do Something About." Washington Post, 6 December 1992, p. A1.

<sup>10</sup>Somalia Background Information for Operation Restore Hope. p. 38.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>US Department of State Dispatch. Fact Sheet: Somalia-Operation Restore Hope, 21 December, 1992, Vol 3, No. 51.

<sup>13</sup>Bush, George President, Address to the Nation, Washington D.C., 4 December, 1992.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>US Department of State Dispatch, 21 December 1992, Vol. 3, No. 51.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Bush, George President, Address to the Nation, Washington D.C. 4 December, 1992.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations, Washington D.C. March 1993, p. 13-5.

<sup>21</sup>Bush, George, President, White House Letter to Director Federal Emergency Management Agency dtd August 24th 1992.



## Endnotes

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Joint Lessons Learned Long Report, Operation Hurricane Andrew Relief conducted by CINCFOR on 24 Aug 1992, JULLS Number 02957-01310 (00001), p. 3.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Joint Lessons Learned Long Report, Operation Hurricane Andrew Relief conducted by CINCFOR on 24 Aug 1992, JULLS Number 02261-23961 (00002), p. 20.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Joint Lessons Learned Long Report, Operation Hurricane Andrew Relief conducted by CINCFOR on 24 Aug 1992, JULLS Number 10455-21830 (00003).

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, Operations Other Than War Volume II: Disaster Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 93, p. B-2.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Sanz, Timothy L., The Yugoslav Conflict: A Chronology of Events, Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

This thesis presents a methodology for the transition from national policy to appropriate military force selection. Also introduced are the I-5 Model, which formalizes the path from national strategy to a defined operational environment, and Milspace, a new archetype for the environment of military operations. This thesis answers the need for a procedure that correlates national interests to the selection of appropriate forces, and further aids in understanding the conditions favoring military employment.

#### The U.S. Dilema

Few opinionmakers will contest that the world situation is volatile. The dangers faced today, although different in scope than in the past years, are at least equal in magnitude. A world community at peace remains a distant dream overshadowed by the reality of continuing international conflict. The United States, as a world leader, faces difficult challenges in this environment. During every international crisis, the U.S. response frequently determines how other nations react. This provides the U.S. with a dilemma. Many Americans question the need to maintain a large military force since the threat posed by the former Soviet Union no longer exists. Yet, to remain in a position of strength, the U.S. must retain the capability to respond to all future threats. How then can the U.S. deal with a reduction in forces, yet maintain the capability to decisively defeat any emerging threat? This question becomes more difficult with the examination of recent world situations. Despite continuing U.S. military reductions and closing of forward bases, military requirements and obligations continue. The answer lies in the definition of U.S. national strategy and its subset, national security strategy. These principles provide the

foundation for determining the required military force structure and the appropriate employment of these forces.

### The Weinberger Principles: A Validation

The methodology of this thesis provides a stepwise progression from national strategy to force requirements as derived from stated policy. Matching these force requirements to those forces available, determines the tailored forces for a particular operation. Within the methodology is the I-5 Model, a planning blueprint to transition from strategy to an operating environment. One component of this model is Milspace, the portion of the operating environment specific to military operations. Figure 21 illustrates the complete process.

The Weinberger Doctrine validates this process. In 1984, former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger proposed the following concerning the selection and commitment of United States Military Forces:<sup>1</sup>

1. U.S. Forces should only be committed when we have clearly defined political and military objectives.
2. The relationship between objectives and forces committed should be continually reassessed and readjusted if necessary.
3. U.S. Forces should only be committed when there is reasonable assurance of support from the American people and Congress.
4. U.S. Forces should only be committed as a last resort.
5. U.S. Forces should only be committed in numbers adequate to complete the mission.
6. U.S. Forces should only be committed to combat in defense of interests vital to our nation or allies.




Figure 21. Thesis Methodology

These six points provide a summation of the thought process which can form the foundation for force selection and force deployment models. The methodology of this supports these ideas.

Addressing each of then Secretary Weinberger's points demonstrates how the thesis methodology links national interest and force selection. Specifically, each of the former Defense Secretary's assertions relates to a level of the I-5 Model.

First, Mr. Weinberger refers to actions "in defense of interests vital to our nation or allies." This corresponds to the highest level of the I-5 framework--development of national strategy and national security strategy that defines these vital interests. These vital interests are guides for U.S. domestic programs and foreign policy.

Second, Mr. Weinberger articulates a need for "defined political and military objectives" and emphasizes the need to continually examine the "relationship between objectives and forces." The I-5 Model adheres to this tenet. The model evinces a need for clearly defined objectives as natural progressions from national interests. These objectives translate into the Area of Influence, where all instruments of national power interact in a highly dynamic environment. The characteristics of this environment indicate a constant need for reassessment and adjustment in congruence with the Secretary's argument.

The next statement in the Weinberger Doctrine contends that commitment of U.S. Forces requires a "reasonable assurance of support from the American people and Congress." This is inherent in the I-5 Model since the assignment of objectives and Areas of Influence are directly dependent on national policy, and responsive to Congress and the will of the people.

The final point in Secretary Weinberger's list asserts that commitment of U.S. Forces are "a last resort." The interaction of the instruments of power within the I-5 Model account for the use of American troops in this manner. The model calls for the timely application of the most appropriate instrument(s) of power. Assuming the correct

analysis of a situation, this approach would insure introduction of the military only when required as an integrated component of these instruments.

The Weinberger Doctrine is a keystone document guiding the appropriate selection and deployment of United States Armed Forces. The methodology presented in this thesis formalizes is supportive of Mr. Weinberger's ideas. The resultant blueprint assists the planner in force selection with linkage to national interests and objectives.

#### The Military: Fully Integrated as an Instrument of National Power

In developing the methodology for this thesis, two sub-issues emerged: how military operations fit into national strategy; and secondly, the ambiguity caused by differing service views of the actual military environment.

This thesis presented a case for treating the environment of military operations as a component of a much larger environment, an Area of Influence. The other components of this area are the remaining four instruments of national power, including the humanitarian instrument, a non-traditional concept. To achieve national objectives, all five instruments must be integrated into a course of action applied to the Area of Influence. Furthermore, the optimum means of achieving objectives requires the selective application of the instruments of national power at the appropriate time. This process dispels the traditional approach of a self-contained military environment, isolated from external influences. In doing so, the thesis defines how the military acts in concert with the other instruments of national power in supporting national strategy.

The second sub-issue examined the military operating environment. Differing service definitions of this environment confused the task of determining force requirements. Additionally, today's concepts rely primarily on physical boundaries; fail to adequately address the intangibles that affect this environment; rely on terminology almost exclusively related to combat; and do not fully consider the influences of time.

In response to the amphibology of these definitions, this study presents the concept of Milspace. A new term, Milspace provides an architecture for the military environment that incorporates combat and non-combat actions and considers the impact of external interactions and time. The components of Milspace provide the basis for definition of mission requirements.

The thesis applied the proposed methodology to both successful and unsuccessful military actions. These case studies illustrate the correlation between successful military action and adherence to the principles of the methodology. Conversely, when these principles are ignored, the tendency is toward an unsuccessful operation. The final case study applied the methodology to the Balkan crisis and demonstrated the applicability to a hypothetical situation.

#### Summation

This thesis fills the need for a formalized process of military force selection and employment. The provided solution includes:

1. A process to translate national strategy into appropriate military force selection;
2. A means to fully incorporate all the instruments of national power into military planning;
3. A methodology that, if used correctly, employs the military at the most appropriate time;
4. A contemporary model that takes into account today's humanitarian instrument of power and non-traditional military operations;
5. A model that breaks the mold of a self-contained military environment isolated from external influences;
6. A methodology that has a basis in the Weinberger Doctrine.

**Endnote**

**'U.S. News and World Report, 10 December 1984, p.8**



**APPENDIX A**  
**FORCE TABLES**

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT (COMBAT) TABLES**

**TABLE 13**  
**FORCE EMPLOYMENT COMBAT (AIR )**

Capability	Asset		Aircraft	Mission	Comments
Wpn Divry	Helo Attack	A	AH-1,H-1,58 <sup>1</sup> ,64	CAS	Land D/N
	Helo Attack	M	AH-1	CAS	Land D/N
	Helo Attack	N	H-60	Anti-ship/sub	Ship based D/N, All Wx
	Helo Attack	SF	H-60,500	Non-conventional	D/N
	Fixed Wing	M	AV-8, <sup>2</sup> F/A-18 <sup>3</sup>	CAS, AI, BAI	Ship based D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	M	AV-8, F/A-18	CAS, AI, BAI	Land based D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	Carrier Air <sup>4</sup>	ASW,AI,ASUW, CAS, BAI	Ship based D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	Carrier Air	ASW,AI,ASUW, CAS, BAI	Land based D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	B-1,2, F-111, B-52	BAI	Strategic D/N
	Fixed Wing	AF	F-4G,15,16, F-117,A-10	BAI, CAS, AI	Tactical D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	AC-130	CAS	D/N
<sup>1</sup> AHIPS may be deployed on Navy vessels					
<sup>2</sup> Normally on LPA/LPH Class ships					

**TABLE 13**

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT COMBAT (AIR )**

<sup>3</sup>	Carrier based
<sup>4</sup>	Aircraft include: A-6, F/A-18, F-14, S-3, EA-6 and E-2

TABLE 14

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT COMBAT (SEA)

Capability	Asset		Ship	Mission	Comments
Military					
Wpn Dlvry	Surface	N	CV, CG, CGN, DD,DDG, FF, FFG	ASW, ASUW, AAW, C2, Strike Warfare	
	Sub-surface	N	SSN, SSBN,	ASW, ASUW, Strategic Missile launch, Surveillance, Strike Warfare, Special	
	Light Forces	N	PHM, PBC, PBR, ATC	Riverboats, Coastal patrol boats, hydrofoil	
Mine Warfare	Surface	N	MSO, MCM, MHC	Mine Warfare, Mine Countermeasure	
	Sub-surface	N	SSN	Mine delivery	

TABLE 15

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT COMBAT (LAND)

Capability	Unit		Equipment	Mission	Comments
Wpn Dlvry					
	Armor	A	M1/M1A1, Tank, CFV(M3), 107mm Mortar	Seizure and control of land areas	D/N Land, Heavy Armor, open terrain environment
	Mechanized Infantry	A	BFV(M2), M901 ITV, Rifle, 107mm Mortar, TOW, Dragon	Seizure and control of land areas.	D/N Land, Light Armor, open terrain environment
	Light Infantry	A	Rifle, 60mm and 81mm Mortar, TOW, Dragon,	Rapid strategically deployable seizure and control of land areas.	D/N Land, Low Armor, restricted terrain environment
	Airborne	A	M551, Rifle, 60mm and 81mm, Mortar, TOW, Dragon, HHMMVV, .50 cal.	Seizure and control of small objectives (airfields, terrain, supply routes). NEO. Requires USAF support.	Air Drop, D/N Land, All Wx. Low Armor environment
	Air Assault	A	Rifle, 60mm and 81mm, Mortar, TOW, Dragon, HHMMVV, .50 cal	Strategic and tactical insertion and extraction using organic helicopters. Seizure and control of small objectives.	Air Assault and Redeployment in hostile environment. D/N.
	Ranger	A	Rifle, HHMMVV, 60mm		
	Armored	A	M1/M1A1,	Recon, Security	Land D/N,

TABLE 15

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT COMBAT (LAND)

	Calvary		CFV(M3), Dragon		All Wx
	Artillery	A	MLRS, ATAMCS 105mm, 203mm, 155mm	Destruction, suppression, or neutraization of hostile targets.	Land D/N, All Wx
	Air Defense	A	Patriot, Chapparral, Hawk, Stinger, Vulcan	High, Medium and Low altitude air defense	Land D/N, All Wx
	Engineer	A	Volcano	Mine Deployment	Land D/N, All Wx
	Marine Armor	M	M1A1, M-60, LAV, M88, AAV	Rapid strategically deployable seizure and control of beach and in-land objectives	Amphibious D/N, All Wx. Light armor environment
	Marine Artillery	M	203mm(M110) 155mm(M198) 155mm(M109)	Destruction, suppression, or neutraization of hostile targets.	Amphibious D/N, All Wx
	Marine Infantry	M	Rifle, HMMWV	Rapid strategically deployable seizure and control of beach and in-land objectives	Amphibious D/N, All Wx. Low armor, restricted terrain environment.
	Marine Air Defense	M	Stinger, Hawk	Medium and Low altitude air defense	Amphibious D/N, All Wx
	Special Forces	SF/ M	As dictated by mission.	Unconventional Covert or Direct	D/N Land/Amphib.

**TABLE 15**

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT COMBAT (LAND)**

				Action , special reconnaissance, NEO	All Wx
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**FORCE EMPLOYMENT (NON-COMBAT) TABLES**

TABLE 16

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (AIR )

Capability	Asset		Aircraft	Mission	Comments
Logistics					
Transport	Helo	A	H-1,47,54,60	Pax,Med,Hvy Lift	Land D/N
	Helo	M	H-1,46,53	Pax,Med,Hvy Lift	Land/Sea, D/N, All Wx
	Helo	N	H-3,46,53,60	Pax,Med,Hvy Lift	Land/Sea, D/N, All Wx
	Helo	AF	H-3,53,60	Pax,Med,Hvy Lift	Land D/N, All Wx
	Helo	SF	MH-53, MH-60	Special Operations	Land D/N, All Wx
	Helo	M	H-3, 60	VIP transfer, Command and Control	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	C-12, C-9	Pax, Cargo	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	C-2	Pax, Cargo	Land/Sea, D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	C-5,141,17	Strategic Lift	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	C-9,C-130, KC-135, KC-10,	Tactical Lift	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	SF	MH-130	Non-conventional	Land D/N, All Wx

TABLE 16

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (AIR)

Refuel	Fixed Wing	N	KA-6	Carrier Air Refuel	Land/Sea D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	KC-135, KC-10	Airborne Refuel	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	SF	HC-130N	Airborne Refuel	Land D/N, All Wx
Medivac	Helo	A	H-1,47		Land D/N
	Helo	N	H-1,3, 46, 60		Land/Sea, D/N, All Wx
	Helo	AF	H-3,60		Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	C-9		Land D/N, All Wx
SAR	Helo	N	H-3,60	SAR, CSAR	Land/Sea D/N, All Wx
	Helo	AF	H-53,60	SAR, CSAR	Land D/N, All Wx
	Helo	SF	MH-53, MH-60	CSAR	Land D/N, All Wx
Intelligence					
	Helo	A	OH-58,60	Recon, ESM	Land D/N
	Helo	N	SH-60	Surveillance, ESM	Land/Sea D/N, All Wx

TABLE 16

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (AIR )

	Fixed Wing	A	OV-1	Recon, ELINT	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	S-3, E-2	Surveillance, ESM	Sea/Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	P-3	Surveillance, ESM	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	M	OV-10	Recon, FAS	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	E-3, TR-1/U-2, JSTAR (E-8)	Surveillance, ESM, ELINT, COMLINT, ECM, Recon	Land D/N, All Wx
	UAV	M/ N	Pioneer	Recon	Land/Sea D/N, All Wx
EMS					
	Helo	A	EH-60	ESM, ECCM	Land D/N
	Fixed Wing	A	RC-12, RC-21, RV-1, RC-126, DHC-7, Pioneer	ELINT, SIGINT, FLIR	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	EA-6B, ES-3	ESM, ECCM, ECM	Sea/Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	EP-3, EC-130	ESM, ECCM, ECM	Land D/N, All Wx

**TABLE 16**

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (AIR )**

	Fixed Wing	M	EA-6B	ESM, ECCM, ECM	Sea/Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	EF-111, EC-130, EC-135	EW, ELINT, COMINT, ESM, ECCM	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	SF	EC-130	PsyOps	Land D/N, All Wx
C2					
	Fixed Wing	N	E-2	Airborne Command and Control, Early Warning	Land/Sea D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	E-3	Airborne Command and Control, Early Warning	Land D/N, All Wx

**TABLE 17**  
**FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (SEA)**

Capability	Asset		Ship	Mission	Comments
Logistics					
Transport	Amphibious	N	LPH, LPA, LHA, LST, LSD, LPD, LHD, LKA	Transport/Delivery of Marine Forces	
	Landing Craft	N/A	LCAC, LSV, LCU, LCM	Transport from amphibious ships to shore	
	MPS	N	TAK	Transport/Delivery of Marine Support Equipment	
	Prepositioning Ships (Lash, Tankers, Freighters)	N	TAK, TAOT	Transport, Delivery, Repair	
	Ocean Transportation	Civ	Roll-on/Roll-off, Freighters, Combination, Tankers	Trans-oceanianic Transport/Delivery	
	Fast Sealift	N	TAKR	Transport/Delivery of Army Support Equipment	
Underway Replenishment		N	AE, AFS, AO, AOE, AOR	Afloat Ammunition and Stores Support	
Material Support		N	AD, AR, ARS, ASR, ATF, AS	Repair, Salvage, Sub rescue, Ocean Tug	Shipboard facilities
		N	Unit, Intermediate and Depot	Replacement, repair and performance of	Afloat and Ashore facilities

**TABLE 17**

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (SEA)**

			<b>Level Maintenance Facilities</b>	<b>scheduled services</b>	
<b>Medical</b>		<b>N</b>	<b>Mercy, Comfort</b>	<b>Hospital Ships</b>	
<b>C2</b>		<b>N</b>	<b>LCC, AGF</b>	<b>Command, Control, Communication</b>	
<b>Intelligence</b>					
	<b>Intelligence Unit</b>	<b>N</b>			
	<b>Cryptographic Unit</b>	<b>N</b>			
	<b>Oceanographic Unit</b>	<b>N</b>			

TABLE 18

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (LAND)

Capability	Unit		Equipment	Mission	Comments
Logistics					
Transport					
	Light Truck Co	A	2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks	Light haul	
	Medium Truck Co	A	12 ton, 22 1/2, 34 ton flatbed, 5,000gl tanker, 7 1/2 ton reefer	Medium haul	
	Heavy Truck Co	A	60 ton semi-trailer	Heavy haul	
	Light-medium Truck Co	A	2 1/2 and 12 ton truck	Med haul	
	Transportation Co (petroleum)				
Supply	Ordnance				
	Quartermaster				
	Petroleum Supply	A		Petroleum receipt, storage, and transfer	
	Water Supply	A		Supply and storage of water	
	Field Service Support	A	Unit, Intermediate and	Food, Water , Personal Welfare and Comfort Items, Clothing and Equipment, Laundry, Bath and Renovation, Graves Registration	
	Maintenance	A	Unit, Intermediate	Replacement, repair and	



TABLE 18

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (LAND)

			and Depot Level Maintenance Facilities	performance of scheduled services	
Construction	Engineer	A		Port construction, Pipeline construction, mapping, survey support, Facility restoration, In-land waterway repair/ construction	
	SeaBees	N			
Medical					
	Evacuation Medical Ambulance Co.	A	M170,178 front-line ambulances M725,886,893, 1010 truck ambulances, M113 personnel carrier , M996/7 HMMVV ambulance	front line and rear medical evacuation	D/N Land, All Wx, hostile and benign conditions.
	Hospitalization	A	MASH, CSH, Evacuation/ Station/General /Field Hospitals, Medical Holding Co.		
	Dental	A	Medical Co		

**TABLE 18**  
**FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (LAND)**

			Dental Svcs, Medical Team Prosthodontics		
	Combat Stress	A	Medical Co and Detachment, Combat Stress Control		
	Preventive	A	Entomology, Sanitation		
	Veterinary	A	Veterinary Service Detachment		
	Laboratory	A	Theatre Army Medical Laboratory		
	Logistics	A	Medical Battalion Logistics Fwd/Rear	Supply, Optical, Blood, Maintenance	
	Teams	A	Detachment Surgical, Team Head and Neck/Eye Surgery/ Neurosurgery/ Dialysis/ Pathology/ Infectious Diseases		
	Command and Control	A	Medical Command/ Brigade/Group		
Intelligence					
	Intelligence	A	Military Intelligence Unit	ELINT, COMLINT, HUMINT,	

TABLE 18

## FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (LAND)

				Imagery, Interrogation, Counterintelligence, MASINT, Deception	
	Engineer	A		Terrain Analysis	
	Weather	AF/ N		Wx Forecast, Analysis, Support. Climate analysis.	
	Special Forces	A		Special Recon, Interrogation	
	Civil Affairs	A	Special Operations Forces	HUMINT	
Military					
	Engineer	A	CEV, AVL B, MCLC	Obstacle Construction and Clearance, Counter Mine, Bridging	
	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	A			
	Chemical	A	M1059(M157)	NBC decon, Smoke generation	
	Military Police	A	HMMWV	Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, EPW Operations, Law and Order	
	Special Forces	A		CSAR, Counterterrorism, Foreign Internal	

**TABLE 18**

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (LAND)**

				Defense, Security Assistance and Activities, Counter-narcotics	
Information					
	Special Forces	A		Psychological operations, Civil Affairs	
	Psychological Operations	A	Special Forces, Special Operations Forces		
	Civil Affairs	A	Special Operations Forces	Populace and Resource Control, Foreign Nation Support, Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Defense. Civil Assistance and Administration.	
	Censorship/ Public Information				
	Military Law				
EMS					
	Signal	A	Radio, Wire and Cable, Automation, Visual and Sound, and Manual Systems	Planning, installation, operation and administration of communication systems	
	Intelligence	A	MI Unit (Organic aviation),	ELINT, COMINT, ESM, ECM, ECCM	

**TABLE 18**

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT NON-COMBAT (LAND)**

			Communication and Jamming Co, EW Co, Collection Co		
C2					
	Corps	A			
	Logistic Organizations	A			
	Air Traffic Control	A/ AF			
	Signal	A	Radio, Wire and Cable, Automation, Visual and Sound, and Manual Systems	Planning, installation, operation and administration of communication systems	
	Intelligence	A	Military Intelligence Unit	Intelligence command and control	

**FORCE SUPPORT TABLES**

**TABLE 19**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (AIR)**

Capability	Asset		Aircraft	Mission	Comments
<b>Military</b>					
Wpn Dlvry	Helo Attack	A	AH-1,58,64	CAS	Land D/N
	Helo Attack	M	AH-1	CAS	Land D/N
	Helo Attack	N	H-60	Anti-ship/sub	Ship based D/N, All Wx
	Helo Attack	SF	H-60,500	Non-conventional	D/N
	Fixed Wing	M	AV-8, F/A-18	CAS, AI, BAI	Ship based D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	M	AV-8, F/A-18	CAS, AI, BAI	Land based D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	Carrier Air	ASW,ALASUW, CAS, BAI	Ship based D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	Carrier Air	ASW,AI,ASUW, CAS, BAI	Land based D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	B-1,2, F-111, B-52	BAI	Strategic D/N
	Fixed Wing	AF	F-4G,15,16, F-117,A-10	BAI, CAS, AI	Tactical D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	AC-130	CAS	D/N
Mine Warfare	Helo	N	H-53	Anti-Mine Acoustic/Non-	Sea D, All Wx

**TABLE 19**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (AIR)**

				Acoustic, Surface and Subsurface	
	Helo	A	H-60	Mine deployment	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	Carrier Air Wing	Mine deployment	Sea D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	P-3	Mine deployment	Land based/Sea deployed D/N, All Wx
Logistics					
Transport	Helo	A	H-1,47,54,60	Pax,Med,Hvy Lift	Land D/N
	Helo	M	H-1,46,53	Pax,Med,Hvy Lift	Land/Sea, D/N, All Wx
	Helo	N	H-3,46,53,60	Pax,Med,Hvy Lift	Land/Sea, D/N, All Wx
	Helo	AF	H-3,53,60	Pax,Med,Hvy Lift	Land D/N, All Wx
	Helo	M	H-3, 60	VIP transfer, Command and Control	Land D/N, All Wx
	Helo	SF	MH-53, MH-60	Special Operations	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	C-12, C-9	Pax, Cargo	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	C-2	Pax, Cargo	Land/Sea, D/N,



**TABLE 19**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (AIR)**

					All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	C-5,141,17	Strategic Lift	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	C-9,C-130, KC-135, KC-10,	Tactical Lift	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	SF	MH-130	Non-conventional	Land D/N, All Wx
Refuel	Fixed Wing	N	KA-6	Carrier Air Refuel	Land/Sea D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	KC-135, KC-10	Airborne Refuel	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	SF	HC-130N	Airborne Refuel	Land D/N, All Wx
Medivac	Helo	A	H-1,47		Land D/N
	Helo	N	H-1,3, 46, 60		Land/Sea, D/N, All Wx
	Helo	AF	H-3,60		Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	C-9		Land D/N, All Wx
SAR	Helo	N	H-3,60	SAR, CSAR	Land/Sea D/N, All Wx
	Helo	AF	H-53,60	SAR, CSAR	Land D/N, All Wx

**TABLE 19**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (AIR)**

<b>Intelligence</b>					
	<b>Helo</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>OH-58,60</b>	<b>Recon, ESM</b>	<b>Land D/N</b>
	<b>Helo</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>SH-60</b>	<b>Surveillance, ESM</b>	<b>Land/Sea D/N, All Wx</b>
	<b>Fixed Wing</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>OV-1</b>	<b>Recon, ELINT</b>	<b>Land D/N, All Wx</b>
	<b>Fixed Wing</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>S-3, E-2</b>	<b>Surveillance, ESM</b>	<b>Sea/Land D/N, All Wx</b>
	<b>Fixed Wing</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>OV-10</b>	<b>Recon, FAS</b>	<b>Land D/N, All Wx</b>
	<b>Fixed Wing</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>P-3</b>	<b>Surveillance, ESM</b>	<b>Land D/N, All Wx</b>
	<b>Fixed Wing</b>	<b>AF</b>	<b>E-3, TR-1/U-2, JSTAR (E-8)</b>	<b>Surveillance, ESM, ELINT, COMINT, ECM, ECCM, Recon</b>	<b>Land D/N, All Wx</b>
	<b>UAV</b>	<b>M/ N</b>	<b>Pioneer</b>	<b>Recon</b>	<b>Land/Sea, D/N, All Wx</b>
<b>EMS</b>					
	<b>Helo</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>EH-60</b>	<b>ESM, ECCM</b>	<b>Land D/N</b>
	<b>Fixed Wing</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>RC-12, RC-21, RV-1, RC-126, DHC-7,</b>	<b>ELINT, SIGINT, FLIR</b>	<b>Land D/N, All Wx</b>

**TABLE 19**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (AIR)**

			Pioneer		
	Fixed Wing	N	EA-6B, ES-3	ESM, ECCM, ECM	Sea/Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	N	EP-3, EC-130	ESM, ECCM, ECM	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	M	EA-6B	ESM, ECCM, ECM	Sea/Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	SF	EC-130	PsyOps	Land D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	EF-111, EC-135, EC-130	ELINT, EW, COMINT	Land D/N, All Wx
C2					
	Fixed Wing	N	E-2	Airborne Command and Control, Early Warning	Land/Sea D/N, All Wx
	Fixed Wing	AF	E-3	Airborne Command and Control, Early Warning	Land D/N, All Wx

**TABLE 20**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (SEA)**

Capability	Asset		Ship	Mission	Comments
<b>Military</b>					
Wpn Dlvry	Surface	N	CV, CG, CGN, DD, DDG, FF, FFG	ASW, ASUW, AAW, C2, Strike Warfare	
	Sub-surface	N	SSN, SSBN,	ASW, ASUW, Strategic Missile launch, Surveillance, Strike Warfare, Special	
	Light Forces	N	PHM, PBC, PBR, ATC	Riverboats, Coastal patrol boats, hydrofoil	
Mine Warfare	Surface	N	MSO, MCM, MHC	Mine Warfare, Mine Countermeasure	
	Sub-surface	N	SSN	Mine delivery	
	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	N	N/A		
<b>Logistics</b>					
Transport	Amphibious	N	LPH, LPA, LHA, LST, LSD, LPD, LHD, LKA	Transport/ Delivery of Marine Forces	
	Landing Craft	N/A	LCAC, LSV, LCU, LCM	Transport from amphibious ships to shore	
	MPS	N	TAK	Transport/ Delivery of Marine Support Equipment	
	Prepositioning Ships (Lash,	N	TAK, TAOT	Transport, Delivery, Repair	

**TABLE 20**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (SEA)**

	<b>Tankers, Freighters)</b>				
	<b>Ocean Transportation</b>	<b>Civ</b>	<b>Roll-on/ Roll-off, Freighters, Combination, Tankers</b>	<b>Trans-oceanianic Transport/ Delivery</b>	
	<b>Fast Sealift</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>TAKR</b>	<b>Transport/ Delivery of Army Support Equipment</b>	
<b>Underway Replenishment</b>		<b>N</b>	<b>AE, AFS, AO, AOE, AOR</b>	<b>Afloat Ammunition and Stores Support</b>	
<b>Material Support</b>		<b>N</b>	<b>AD, AR, ARS, ASR, ATF, AS</b>	<b>Repair, Salvage, Sub rescue, Ocean Tug</b>	<b>Shipboard facilities</b>
		<b>N</b>	<b>Unit, Intermediate and Depot Level Maintenance Facilities</b>	<b>Replacement, repair and performance of scheduled services</b>	<b>Afloat and Ashore facilities</b>
<b>Medical</b>		<b>N</b>	<b>Mercy, Comfort</b>	<b>Hospital Ships</b>	
<b>C2</b>		<b>N</b>	<b>LCC, AGF</b>	<b>Command, Control, Communication</b>	
<b>Intelligence</b>					
	<b>Intelligence Unit</b>	<b>N</b>			
	<b>Cryptographic Unit</b>	<b>N</b>			
	<b>Oceanographic Unit</b>	<b>N</b>			

**TABLE 21**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (LAND)**

Capability	Unit		Equipment	Mission	Comments
Wpn Dlvry					
	Armor	A	M1/M1A1, Tank, CFV(M3), 107mm Mortar	Seizure and control of land areas	D/N Land, Heavy Armor, open terrain environment
	Mechanized Infantry	A	BFV(M2), M901 ITV, Rifle, 107mm Mortar, TOW, Dragon	Seizure and control of land areas.	D/N Land, Light Armor, open terrain environment
	Light Infantry	A	Rifle, 60mm and 81mm Mortar, TOW, Dragon,	Rapid strategically deployable seizure and control of land areas.	D/N Land, Low Armor, restricted terrain environment
	Airborne	A	M551, Rifle, 60mm and 81mm, Mortar, TOW, Dragon, HMMWV, .50 cal.	Seizure and control of small objectives (airfields, terrain, supply routes). NEO. Requires USAF support.	Air Drop, D/N Land, All Wx. Low Armor environment
	Air Assault	A	Rifle, 60mm and 81mm, Mortar, TOW, Dragon, HMMWV, .50 cal	Strategic and tactical insertion and extraction using organic helicopters. Seizure and control of small objectives.	Air Assault and Redeployment in hostile environment. D/N.
	Ranger	A	Rifle, HMMWV, 60mm		

**TABLE 21**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (LAND)**

	Armored Calvary	A	M1/M1A1, CFV(M3), Dragon	Recon, Security	Land D/N, All Wx
	Artillery	A	MLRS, ATAMCS 105mm, 203mm, 155mm	Destruction, suppression, or neutraization of hostile targets.	Land D/N, All Wx
	Air Defense	A	Patriot, Chapparral, Hawk, Stinger, Vulcan	High, Medium and Low altitude air defense	Land D/N, All Wx
	Engineer	A	Volcano	Mine Deployment	Land D/N, All Wx
	Marine Armor	M	M1A1, M-60, LAV, M88, AAV	Rapid strategically deployable seizure and control of beach and in-land objectives	Amphibious D/N, All Wx. Light armor environment
	Marine Artillery	M	203mm(M110) 155mm(M198) 155mm(M109)	Destruction, suppression, or neutraization of hostile targets.	Amphibious D/N, All Wx
	Marine Infantry	M	Rifle, HMMWV	Rapid strategically deployable seizure and control of beach and in-land objectives	Amphibious D/N, All Wx. Low armor, restricted terrain environment.
	Marine Air Defense	M	Stinger, Hawk	Medium and Low altitude air defense	Amphibious D/N, All Wx

**TABLE 21**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (LAND)**

	Special Forces	SF/ M	As dictated by mission.	Unconventional Covert or Direct Action , special reconnaissance, NEO	D/N Land/Amphib. All Wx
Logistics					
Transport					
	Light Truck Co	A	2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks	Light haul	
	Medium Truck Co	A	12 ton, 22 1/2, 34 ton flatbed, 5,000gl tanker, 7 1/2 ton reefer	Medium haul	
	Heavy Truck Co	A	60 ton semi-trailer	Heavy haul	
	Light-medium Truck Co	A	2 1/2 and 12 ton truck	Med haul	
	Transportation Co (petroleum)				
Supply	Ordnance				
	Quartermaster				
	Petroleum Supply	A		Petroleum receipt, storage, and transfer	
	Water Supply	A		Supply and storage of water	
	Field Service Support	A	Unit, Intermediate and	Food, Water , Personal Welfare and Comfort Items, Clothing and Equipment, Laundry, Bath	



**TABLE 21**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (LAND)**

				and Renovation, Graves Registration	
	Maintenance	A	Unit, Intermediate and Depot Level Maintenance Facilities	Replacement, repair and performance of scheduled services	
Construction	Engineer	A		Port construction, Pipeline construction, mapping, survey support, Facility restoration, In-land waterway repair/ construction	
	SeaBees	N			
Medical					
	Evacuation Medical Ambulance Co.	A	M170,178 front-line ambulances M725,886,893, 1010 truck ambulances, M113 personnel carrier , M996/7 HMMVV ambulance	front line and rear medical evacuation	D/N Land, All Wx, hostile and benign conditions.
	Hospitalization	A	MASH, CSH, Evacuation/ Station/General		

**TABLE 21**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (LAND)**

			/Field Hospitals, Medical Holding Co.		
	Dental	A	Medical Co Dental Svcs, Medical Team Prosthodontics		
	Combat Stress	A	Medical Co and Detachment, Combat Stress Control		
	Preventitive	A	Entomology, Sanitation		
	Veterinary	A	Veterinary Service Detachment		
	Laboratory	A	Theatre Army Medical Laboratory		
	Logistics	A	Medical Battalion Logistics Fwd/Rear	Supply, Optical, Blood, Maintenance	
	Teams	A	Detachment Surgical, Team Head and Neck/Eye Surgery/ Neurosurgery/ Dialysis/ Pathology/ Infectious Diseases		
	Command and Control	A	Medical Command/		

**TABLE 21**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (LAND)**

			Brigade/Group		
<b>Intelligence</b>					
	<b>Intelligence</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>Military Intelligence Unit</b>	<b>ELINT, COMLINT, HUMINT, Imagery, Interrogation, Counterintelligence, MASINT, Deception</b>	
	<b>Engineer</b>	<b>A</b>		<b>Terrain Analysis</b>	
	<b>Weather</b>	<b>AF/N</b>		<b>Wx Forecast, Analysis, Support. Climate analysis.</b>	
	<b>Special Forces</b>	<b>A</b>		<b>Special Recon, Interrogation</b>	
	<b>Civil Affairs</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>Special Operations Forces</b>	<b>HUMINT</b>	
<b>Military</b>					
	<b>Engineer</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>CEV, AVL, MCLC</b>	<b>Obstacle Construction and Clearance, Counter Mine, Bridging</b>	
	<b>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</b>	<b>A</b>			
	<b>Chemical</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>M1059(M157)</b>	<b>NBC decon, Smoke generation</b>	
	<b>Military Police</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>HMMWV</b>	<b>Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, EPW</b>	

**TABLE 21**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (LAND)**

				Operations, Law and Order	
	Special Forces	A		CSAR, Counterterroism, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Assistance and Activities, Counter-narcotics	
Information					
	Special Forces	A		Psychological operations, Civil Affairs	
	Psychological Operations	A	Special Forces, Special Operations Forces		
	Civil Affairs	A	Special Operations Forces	Populace and Resource Control, Foreign Nation Support, Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Defense. Civil Assistance and Administration.	
	Censorship/ Public Information				
	Military Law				
EMS					
	Signal	A	Radio, Wire and Cable, Automation, Visual and Sound, and	Planning, installation, operation and administration of communication	

**TABLE 21**  
**FORCE SUPPORT (LAND)**

			Manual Systems	systems	
	Intelligence	A	MI Unit (Organic aviation), Communication and Jamming Co, EW Co, Collection Co	ELINT, COMINT, ESM, ECM, ECCM	
C2					
	Corps	A			
	Logistic Organizations	A			
	Air Traffic Control	A/ AF			
	Signal	A	Radio, Wire and Cable, Automation, Visual and Sound, and Manual Systems	Planning, installation, operation and administration of communication systems	
	Intelligence	A	Military Intel Unit	Intelligence command/control	

**APPENDIX B**  
**FORCE ORGANIZATIONS**

## Army<sup>1</sup>

### Heavy Division (Armor/Mechanized Infantry)

A unit composed of large amounts of mobile, armor-protected firepower. Usually employed where battles are fought over wide areas against threats with similar capabilities. Operates best in open terrain. Not designed for jungle, dense forest or mountain operations, and is restricted when operating in built-up areas.

### Light Division

A unit designed for rapid employment of credible forces to stabilize a situation, act as a show of force or secure a base to expand further operations. Not designed to conduct forced entry combat operations. May also conduct operations in restricted or close terrain.

### Air Assault Division

A unit designed to conduct combat operations through transport of infantry and field artillery using helicopters. Deploys with the necessary combat support and combat service support. Capable of rapid aerial redeployment.

### Airborne Division

A unit designed for rapid worldwide aerial deployment, in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force, for assault and follow-on defense operations. May be used to secure critical installations or facilities, reinforce other forces or conduct a show of force. Optimally used if after the initial aerial assault additional units are airlanded.

### Armored Cavalry Regiment

A unit designed for reconnaissance, security and combat operations over large areas using helicopter and ground assets. Most often used in conjunction with other forces.

### **Infantry (Motorized) Division**

A unit designed for combat in desert and mountainous terrain with the flexibility to provide increased mobility and firepower in restricted operations. Capable of immediate combat operations upon arrival in any conflict environment, and the quick retrieval from the operation after the mission is completed.

### **Separate Brigades**

Designed to operate independently of divisions and may be assigned additional support assets. Usually consisting of up to five maneuver battalions they may be either:

1. Separate Brigade Heavy
2. Separate Brigade Infantry
3. Separate Brigade Light

### **Airborne Special Forces Group**

Units designed to plan and conduct operations in unconventional warfare, special operations and foreign internal defense.



## Navy<sup>2</sup>

### Joint Task Forces

A group of ships, either multi-national or in support of multi-service operations, organized for the purpose of conducting anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and strike operations.

### Carrier Battle Group

A group of ships, centered around an aircraft carrier(s), organized for the purpose of conducting anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and strike operations.

### Surface Action Group

A group of ships, excluding an aircraft carrier, organized for the purpose of conducting anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and strike operations.

### Amphibious Task Forces

The land, sea and air forces organized, equipped and trained for landing forces from the sea. This includes the naval, landing and supporting forces.

### Underway Replenishment Groups

A group of ships organized for the purpose of providing supplies, fuel, ammunition and other combat support services to combatants.

### Convoy Escort Groups

A group of ships organized for the purpose of conducting protecting non-combatant vessels from anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine threats.

## **Air Force<sup>3</sup>**

### **Squadrons (arranged into task organized wings)**

1. Strategic bomber
2. Air refueling
3. Strategic command and control
4. Intelligence
5. Fighter
6. Tactical electronic warfare
7. Special operations forces
8. Tactical air command and control
9. Tactical air control
10. Weather
11. Rescue
12. Tactical airlift
13. Strategic airlift
14. Special Mission
15. ICBM

## **Marine Corps<sup>4</sup>**

### **Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)**

#### **Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)**

A composite amphibious group consisting of one or more Marine Divisions, one or more Marine Air Wings and one or more Force Service Support Groups.

#### **Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)**

A composite amphibious group consisting of one or more reinforced Infantry Regiments, one or more composite Air Groups and an appropriate size Brigade Service Support Group.

#### **Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)**

A composite amphibious group consisting of a reinforced Infantry Battalion, composite Air Squadron, Combat Service Support MEU Service Support Group.

#### **Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF)**

An amphibious capable force specifically tailored for a particular operation.

### **Marine Corps Security Forces (MCSF)**

Forces assigned to protect key naval installations and embassies worldwide ashore and afloat. Includes a Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Team (FAST) company which may deploy to reinforce high threat locations, provide security for nuclear fueling operations and respond to other crises and contingency sites as directed.

### **Supporting Establishments**

Forces manning the establishments used to support Marine operations.

### **Space**

USSPACECOM provides centralized control of Army, Naval and Air Force space operations and is responsible for military space operations, control, support and warning in direct support to other US combat commands. This involves the following:

1. Communications
2. Navigation/Positioning
3. Weather and Environment
4. Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Target Acquisition
5. Geographic Remote Sensing Satellites
6. Space Surveillance

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 101-10-1/2 Staff Officers Field Manual Organizational, Tactical and Logistical Data Planning Factors (Vol. 2), October 1987.

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<sup>3</sup>Air Force Magazine, Air Force Almanac 1993.

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